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I. INTRODUCTION

In Baby Boy v. United States,' an informal, non-binding resolution
by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Commission or
LACHR), the quasi-judicial regional human rights body, concluded that
the abortion of "Baby Boy," a 24 to 26 week-old male fetus was
permissible under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man 3 (American Declaration or Declaration) and, incidentally, the
American Convention on Human Rights4 (American Convention or
Convention), notwithstanding the fact that the latter protects the right to
life "from the moment of conception" and the former contains an
implied right to life from conception for every "human being." In
addition, the Commission held that the U.S. creation of a fundamental
right to abortion through Roe v. Wade was not incompatible with the
Declaration or the Convention, and that neither instrument required
Member States to ban abortion. 5
This Article examines the nature of the Baby Boy resolution, its
potential legal effects, the legal weight it actually has in the InterAmerican system, and whether it created a treaty exception to the right
to life for voluntary abortion. It concludes that Baby Boy did not validly
create an abortion exception to the right to life in the Inter-American
system on human rights. It also demonstrates that Baby Boy is not an
authoritative interpretation of the Declaration or the Convention, has no
precedential value on abortion in the Inter-American system of human
1. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.LN/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, availableat http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/80.81eng/
USA2141.htm.
2. IACHR, What is the IACHR?, http://www.cidh.oas.org/what.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2011).
3. O.A.S., American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 1948,
OAS/Ser.L/V/1.4, rev. 13, available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/oasinstr/zoas2dec.htm
[hereinafter American Declaration].
4. O.A.S., American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123,
[hereinafter American
available at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html
Convention].
5. Baby Boy, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/Serv.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, Resolves 1.
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rights, and therefore neither Latin American states nor the InterAmerican Court on Human Rights have a duty to follow the
Commission's decision therein.
[If conception produces a human life, and this right is the
primary andfundamental one, abortion is an attack on the right
to lfe and, therefore, runs counter to Article 1 of the American
Declarationof the Rights and Duties of Man.
Commissioner Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra 6

II. THE RIGHT TO LIFE FROM CONCEPTION IN THE INTER-AMERICAN
SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS
A. The American Convention on Human Rights: A Distinctly ProLife Treaty
With the adoption of the American Convention on Human Rights in
1969, Latin American states explicitly recognized that life begins at
conception and granted right to life protection to the unborn child.'
Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic,
Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela,8 parties to
the American Convention, explicitly recognize the unborn child's right
to life in Article 4(1) of the American Convention, which states that
"[e]very person has the right to have his life respected. This right shall
be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life." 9
The distinct acknowledgment of a right to life from conception
contained in Article 4 of the American Convention is invariably singled
out by commentators as the most emphatic recognition of the unborn
child's right to life to date in international law. In 1987, for instance,
Professor Dinah Shelton, a current member of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, pointed out that the American
Convention stands out among other international human rights
6. Id. T 9 (Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, dissenting), availableat http://www.cidh.
org/annualrep/80.81eng/USA2141b.htm.
7. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
8. See O.A.S., General Information of the Treaty [i.e., American Convention on Human
Rights], http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/b-32.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2011)
[hereinafter General Information on the Convention].
9. See American Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
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instruments in its explicit establishment of a "pre-natal right to life."10
Likewise, in the American Declaration, a non-binding regional
instrument, all Member States of the Organization of American States
(O.A.S.)" meant to protect the right to life from conception when they
stated that "every human being has the right to life" in Article I, as
evinced by the explicit inclusion of "those who are not yet born" and a
right to life "from conception" in the Declaration's travaux
pr6paratoires.12
B. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: A Sui Generis,
Quasi-judicialBody
Few international human rights bodies are as misunderstood as the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, due to its particular
nature as a quasi-judicial body, and not a court.' 3 Modeled under the
European Commission on Human Rights, a now defunct institution in
the European system, the Inter-American Commission is a quasijudicial body that serves both a political and a pragmatic purpose in the
O.A.S., a regional governmental organization integrated by most of the
Western Hemisphere, that is, the United States, Canada, and most Latin
American and Caribbean states.14
Headquartered in Washington, D.C., the Commission serves both as
a formal forum of international human rights dispute resolution and a
filter for the Inter-American Court on Human Rights, a regional
international human rights tribunal created by the O.A.S. that
adjudicates individual complaints against States Parties to the American
Convention and exercises oversight functions over the Commission's
practices.15
Despite misinformed claims that Commission resolutions or reports
are legally binding, the Commission does not produce binding
10.

See DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF THE FETUS IN

ABORTION AND THE PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS, LEGAL PROBLEMS IN A CROSS-CULTURAL

PERSPECTIVE. (Stanislaw J. Frankowski & George F. Cole eds., 1987).
11. See O.A.S., Charter of the O.A.S., Apr. 30, 1948, O.A.S. Treaty Series, NOS. 1-C and
61, availableat http://www.oas.org/dil/treatiesA-41_Charter-of the OrganizationofAmerican
States.htm.
12. See American Declaration, supra note 3, Part IV.A.1.
13. See Timo Koivurova, InternationalLegal Avenues to Address the Plight of Victims of
Climate Change: Problems & Prospects,22 J.ENvTL. L. & LITIG. 267, 285 (2007).
14. See IACHR, What is the IACHR?, supra note 2. For further discussion, see generally
Christina M. Cerna, The Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights, 16 FLA. J.
INT'L L. 195 (2004).
15. See American Convention, supra note 4, arts. 41, 44-51; see also Advisory Opinion
OC-19/05, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 19, 13. (Nov. 28 2005), availableat http://www.
corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_19_esp2.pdf (in Spanish only).
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jurisprudence.' 6 State Parties need to be reminded that only the InterAmerican Court may issue legally binding decisions on all matters
relating to the interpretation or application of the American Convention,
according to Article 62 of the American Convention.' 7 The InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights may submit contentious cases
to the Court' 8 or request consultative opinions regarding authoritative
interpretation of the Convention or its compatibility with domestic laws
and other human rights treaties in the Americas.19 However, at no point
does the Convention or the Commission Statute grant the IACHR
adjudication faculties.
The Commission is only a quasi-judicial body and its reports and
resolutions are non-binding. For instance, even an Article 50 report on
the merits would not be legally binding on State Parties to the American
Convention. IACHR findings and recommendations issued under
Article 50 of the Convention in merits reports are non-binding, and are
not controlling on decisions of the Court.2o Nevertheless, they are given
some political consideration by States Parties involved; their
implementation remaining weak until cases reach the Inter-American
Court for a binding verdict.21
The Inter-American Commission may also mediate friendly
settlements, grant precautionary measures, and issue non-binding
recommendations on individual petitions involving potential human
rights violations, 22 while exerting relatively high political influence in
Latin American countries. Friendly settlement agreements, according to
former IACHR Specialist, Ariel Dulitzky, have a higher compliance rate

16. See Natasha Concepcion, The LegalImplications of Trinidad& Tobago's Withdrawal
from the American Convention on Human Rights, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 847, 856 (2001).
17. American Convention, supranote 4, art. 67(1).
18. See id. art. 63(2).
19. See id. art. 64; Inter-Am. Comm. H.R. Statute, art. 19(d); see also Statute of the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-0/79), O.A.S. Off. Rec.
OEA/Ser.P/IX.0.2/80, Vol. 1 at 88, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/l 1.50, Doc.13, rev. 1, at 10 (1980).
20. The Court has deviated from the Commission's recommendations, either totally or
partially, on several occasions; see Case of Las Palmeras v. Colombia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 90 (Dec. 6 2001); Constitutional Court v. Peru, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C.)
No. 71, (Jan 31, 2001);Case of Nogueira de Carvalho v. Brazil, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
161 (Nov. 28, 2006) (total deviation from Commission's recommendations on the merits); Case
of Cayara v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 14 (Feb.
3, 1993) (deviation from Commission's procedural analysis).
21. Commissioner Felipe Gonzalez, Address at the O.A.S. General Assembly, Peru,
(June 8, 2010), availableat http://www.cidh.oas.org/Discursos/06.08.10eng.htm.
22. See Susan Shin, Comparison of the Dispute Settlement Procedures of the World
Trade Organization for Trade Disputes & the Inter-American System for Human Rights
Violations, 16 N.Y. INT'L L. REv. 43, 65 (2003).
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than any other reports or resolutions issued by the Commission. 23 Thus,
the Commission's authority is political rather than legal in nature, its
main role being that of a filter to the Inter-American Court, often
providing for an opportunity for alternative dispute resolution between
petitioners and their state.
To date, the Commission has never addressed the unborn child's
right to life in any merits report under Article 50 of the Convention.
However, the IACHR issued an informal document entitled "Resolution
23/81" on petition 2141, Baby Boy, which did address the subject of
abortion. 24 Many pro-choice advocates claim that Baby Boy is the InterAmerican system's sole precedent on abortion, and that it allows for
elective abortion as a legitimate exception to the right to life from
conception.25 However, the fact is that, like all of the Commission's
resolutions, Baby Boy does not create international jurisprudence, nor
does it carry any legal weight for subsequent court opinions or state
compliance with the American Convention or Declaration. Even if it
were a formal merit or admissibility report, which it is not, Baby Boy
would not constitute actual precedent, because IACHR resolutions and
reports are non-binding, non-judicial, and therefore do not create
controlling jurisprudence for the Inter-American court or States Parties
to the American Convention or Declaration.

III. BABY BoY:

AN INFORMAL, NON-BINDING RESOLUTION

Not many are aware that Roe v. Wade26 and Doe v. Bolton 27 were
challenged before the IACHR in 1981. The petition was brought by
American pro-life advocates on the grounds that the judicial legalization
of abortion in Roe v. Wade by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973 resulted
in a violation of the right to life of an aborted unborn child, Baby Boy,
in Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kenneth Edelin.2 The
23. Ariel Dulitzky, The 50 Years of the Inter-AMERICAN HUMAN Rights System: A
ProposedReflection About Necessary Strategic Changes, in CENTRO DE EsTUDiOS DE JUSTICIA
DE LAS AMERICAS 496 (Gonzalo Aguilar Cavallo ed., 2008), available at http://www.utexas.
edu/law/faculty/adulitzky/03-5OAnos-Sistema-Interamericano.pdf.
24. See Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar.
6, 1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/80.
8leng/USA2141. htm.
25. See, e.g., Center for Reproductive Rights written comments on Vo v. France (No.
53924/00), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2004), 1 22, referring to Baby Boy as part of the Inter-American
system's "jurisprudence" on the right to life, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
rossrights/docs/cases/VoComm.pdf.
26. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
27. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
28. Commonwealth of Mass. v. Kenneth Edelin, 371 Mass. 497 (1976).
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petitioners alleged that the United States had thereby incurred in
international responsibility for a violation of the American Declaration
of the Ri Pts and Duties of Man, to which it is considered to be a
signatory.
A. Who was Baby Boy?
Baby Boy was a potentially viable male fetus of 24-26 weeks
gestation (approximately 6 months) intentionally aborted by
hysterotomy, a surgical procedure akin to a cesarean section. Baby
Boy's mother was a 17 year-old girl who, along with her mother,
voluntarily requested and consented to the procedure. In
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kenneth Edelin, 3 1 the doctor who
performed the abortion was convicted for manslaughter against Baby
Boy, but was subsequently acquitted by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts.
Given that Roe v. Wade tied state regulation of abortion to the
state's legitimate interest in protecting prenatal life starting at viability,
Baby Boy's ability to survive outside the womb became essential to
determining whether his death by abortion had been legal or illegal.
According to reasoning in Roe, during the first trimester of gestation, a
fetus may be aborted at any time for any reason. 32 If a fetus is viable,
the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life may
regulate, and even proscribe abortion except where necessary for the
"preservation of the life or health of the mother." 33 The said "viability"
criterion is one of the bright line rules established in Roe, according to
which the fetus' dependency on the mother for survival, his
vulnerability and inability to survive independently outside the womb
are used against him. Rather than triggering human rights protection,
non-viability triggers constitutional authorization for doctors and
mothers to abort unborn children in absolute impunity, according to
precedent in U.S. law. 34
Baby Boy's viability was undisputed at trial. He was found to have a

29. See American Declaration, supra note 3, Part Ill.B.
30. Baby Boy mistakenly states Edelin performed a hysterectomy (extraction of the
uterus) on the pregnant teenager. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.IV/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 8. The correct
term, used in national court records, indicates it was actually a hysterotomy (a surgical
procedure on the uterus directed to deliver the unborn child, akin to a C-section). Kenneth
Edelin, 371 Mass. at 498.
31. Id. at 498-99.
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 732 (1973).
33. Kenneth Edelin, 371 Mass. at 528 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 501).
34. See, inter alia, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505

U.S. 833 (1992).
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regular heartbeat at the time of the abortion.3 5 The autopsy
demonstrated he was "a normal child" with a body weight which was
certainly small (600 grams, equivalent to approximately 1.54 pounds), 36
but with which other newborn children have survived.3 7 There was
evidence of respiratory activity and of a fetal age that would indicate
viability. There was evidence that given medical support the baby
would have survived, and that his gestational age of up to twenty-six
weeks placed him in the age bracket appropriate for legal viability, as
indicated by Justice Reardon. 3 8
Even though the evidence indicated that Baby Boy could have
survived the abortion had he been provided subsequent neonatal care,
Dr. Edelin provoked his death in utero, by deliberately delaying his live
birth immediately following the detachment of the placenta, cutting his
oxygen supply inside, rather than outside, of the uterus, in order to
avoid legal restrictions surrounding viability. 39
Initially, Edelin had attempted the abortion through the method of
amniocentesis with saline infusion, an abortion that causes fetal death
by introducing a salt solution into the amniotic sac containing the fetus,
scalding him and causing contractions that would expel his body from
the uterus. 40 Proceeding in the usual way, Dr. Edelin inserted a long
needle through the girl's abdominal skin, hoping to reach into the
amniotic sac and drain off the amniotic fluid to replace it with a salt
solution that would then be let into the sac. 4 ' However, the sac failed to
rupture; so, the next day, he proceeded to perform the abortion by
hysterotomy, making an incision in the uterus to reach and extract the
fetus. 42
After detaching the placenta from the fetus, a physician who
witnessed the abortion testified that he saw Edelin remain motionless
for at least three minutes with his hand in the uterus, his eyes fixed on a
clock on the wall,4 3 waiting for Baby Boy to die from oxygen
deprivation. After a few minutes had elapsed, he delivered the child,
placed him on a stainless steel basin, put his hand on his chest wall for a
few seconds, finding no heartbeat or sign of life. 44 Chief Justice
Hennessey pointed out that there was evidence that "such a procedure is
nowhere sanctioned as accepted medical practice. This was compared
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Edelin, 371 Mass. at 505.
Id. at 504.
Id at 529 (Reardon, J., dissenting).
Id. at 528-29.
Id. at 540-41 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting in part).
Id at 503 (majority opinion).
Id. at 502.
Id at 503.
Id. at 541 (Hennessey, CJ., dissenting in part).
Id. at 504 (majority opinion).
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by one medical witness, Dr. Mecklenburg, to 'cutting the air hose on a
salvage diver."' 4 5
The abortion technique used by Edelin in the abortion of Baby Boy
was found by the trial jury and later by the dissenting justices of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court to be unethical and to constitute reckless
homicidal conduct, "chosen without regard to the possibility of a live
birth."46 In addition, two doctors, Dr. Denis Cavanagh, a diplomate in
the Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists of England, and
Dr. Norman L. Virnig, Director of the Newborn Service at the St. Paul
Ramsey Hospital, testified that the child would have survived the
abortion, had he been removed in a timely manner and given proper
neonatal medical care. 47
Given the fact that the child was, at the very least, potentially viable
and that the abortion obtained by the teenager was not deemed to be
"medically necessary," the prosecution could have pursued a claim of
illegal abortion. However, due to the fact that the abortion took place
between January 1973 and August 1974, the interregnum between Roe
v. Wade and the approval of new state legislation, the prosecution
brought manslaughter charges under Massachusetts' old abortion
statute.48
Technically, manslaughter can only be committed on a live child
completely outside of the woman's body and homicidally destroyed.#
Because the charge required a test of whether a live birth had occurred,
the trial court examined a substantial amount of evidence in order to
determine whether Baby Boy had taken a breath outside the uterus.5 0
Microscopic examination of lung tissue later fixed on slides, showed
partial expansion of some of the alveoli, which suggested respiratory
activity outside the uterus. 5 ' "Dr. John F. Ward, a pathologist, testified
on the basis of his microscopic examination of lung tissue that the fetus
'did breathe outside the uterus.", 52 Therefore, the jury found Dr. Edelin
guilty of manslaqhter, and the judge sentenced him to a penalty of one
year's probation.
On appeal, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reversed the jury
conviction for procedural reasons concluding, among others, that the
45. Id. at 541 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting in part).
46. Id. at 540.
47. Id. at 535-36.
48. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 11 1-2, availableat http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/80.
8leng/USA2141.htm.
49. See Kenneth Edelin, 371 Mass. at 508.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 510.
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case should not have been submitted to a jury verdict at all.54 The court
found that there had been insufficient evidence of viability to proceed to
a jury trial and that there was "prejudicial divergence" between the
accusations against the defendant and instructions given to the jury.5 5
For instance, the court found that showing Baby Boy's preserved body
to the jury, placed in a ten percent solution of formaldehyde by the
resident pathologist, may have caused "unacceptable prejudice" among
jurors. 56 In addition, the court found the evidence that the fetus had
taken a breath outside the uterus to be inconclusive. The majority
opinion stated that even if the fetus had sucked amniotic fluid (as he
might have done when distressed), there had been no evidence that he
had taken a proper breath of oxygen in room air, either through the
uterine incision, or after delivery clear of the uterus and concluded that,
therefore, his delivery did not technically qualify as a live birth.5' The
court found the three to five minute wait by Dr. Edelin after detachment
of the placenta did not constitute recklessness either, because he
believed the fetus to be non-viable.5 9
Edelin was thus acquitted and the abortion of Baby Boy, probably
illegal even under Roe v. Wade's standards, remained in impunity.
Since then, Edelin has testified before Congress on numerous occasions
promoting further deregulation of abortion in the United States,
particularly late-term abortions, as well as the reduction of state
oversight on physicians who perform them.60 He has taught Obstetrics
and Gynecology at Boston University School of Medicine and has been
a member of the Committee on Ethics and Discipline of the
Massachusetts Medical Society.61 In addition, he was the Chairman of
the Board of Planned Parenthood Federation of America from 1989 to
1992.62

54. Id. at 524-25.
55. Id. at 497.
56. Id. at 504.
57. Id. at 505.
58. Id.
59. In Edelin, 371 Mass. at 543 (Hennessey, C.J., dissenting in part). Chief Justice
Hennessey dissented in part, indicating that "the defendant formed his judgment of non-viability
either in bad faith, or unreasonably, based upon facts he knew or reasonably should have
known." Id.
60. Broken Justice.com, About the Author (detailing the lfe of Dr. Kenneth Edelin),
http://brokenjustice.com/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2011).
6 1. Id.

62. Id.
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss2/3
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B. The Petition Reaches the IACHR
In 1977, Christian B. White and Gary K. Potter, representing
Catholics for Christian Political Action, filed a petition against the
United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts before the
IACHR on behalf of Baby Boy.63 They argued that the United States
acted in violation of the right to life granted by Article I ("every human
being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person") and
Article II ("all persons are equal before the law . .. without distinction
as to race, sex, language, creed, or any other factor," age being the key
word here) of the American Declaration, among others, to which the
United States is considered a signatory. 64 The petitioners stated that the
U.S. Supreme Court decisions in Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton 66
had ended legal protection of unborn children in the United States, and
set the stage for the violation of Baby Boy's right to life in
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kenneth Edelin. 67 They requested
the Commission apply the Declaration as interpreted by the American
Convention, which explicitly protects the right to life from the moment
of conception, and find the United States in violation thereof.68
Given that the United States became a member of the O.A.S. on June
19, 1951, the date on which it deposited its instrument of ratification of
the O.A.S. Charter, 69 becoming seat to its headquarters since, the
Commission considers it is automatically bound by the American
Declaration (but not by the American Convention, which requires
ratification), and therefore subject to the individual petitions system
under the Declaration only. In terms of jurisdiction or competence, as
the IACHR calls it, the Commission deems the American Declaration of
the Rights and Duties of Man and the Statute and Rules of Procedure of
63. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/III.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 1 3.
64. American Declaration, supra note 3, arts. I-Il.
65. Roe v.Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
66. Doe v. Balton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
67. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.LV/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, T 3(b).
68. Id. 1-13.
69. For instance, in William Andrews v. United States, the U.S. government cited Baby
Boy when arguing that the Commission had no authority to impose upon a State, by means of
"interpretation," an international obligation based upon an international instrument that the State
has not duly accepted or ratified, such as the Declaration. Here, the State Department stated:
"the United States categorically rejects the petitioners' contention that the American Declaration
and the Statute and Regulations of the Commission has acquired legally binding force for all
OAS member countries. As the United States has previously noted, the Declaration is not a
treaty and has not acquired binding legal force." [.. .] "In this respect, the Commission has no
authority to rewrite the American Declaration, which is what the petition has invited it to do."
See Report No 57/96, Case 11.139, William Andrews, United States, Dec. 6, 1996, T$ 59, 77,
availableat http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/usal 1139. htm#_ftn22.
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the IACHR to have acquired "binding force" on the United States,
according to Articles 3(i), 16, 5 1(e), 112 and 150 of the O.A.S. Charter,
ratified by the United States on April 23, 1968,70 an assertion that the
United States has repeatedly contested. 7 1 Notwithstanding its objections,
the U.S. Government has often responded and defended itself against
human rights violations claims before the Commission, inevitably
submitting itself to the individual petitions system. 72 Baby Boy was such
an instance.
The procedure before the Commission consisted of an exchange of
communications between the state and the petitioners resulting in
resolution 23/81: not a merits report, but a document of lesser status
addressing the Commission's views on the States parties' compliance
with the American Declaration, in accordance with special procedures
established for countries like the United States or Canada, that have
adopted the Declaration, but not the Convention. 73 Because the
Commission acts similarly to an international mediator, it initially
limited itself to transmitting communications between the petitioners
and the U.S. Government before issuing a resolution. The said
70. See id.; Case No. 9647 (United States), Res. 3/87, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.71, Doc. 9, rev. 1,
Mar. 27, 1987. See also Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American
Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 7-8 (1985), where the former Inter-American Court
judge points out that, even though the Declaration is clearly not a "treaty" within the meaning of
Article 64(1) of the American Convention,
it is generally recognized, however, that the Protocol of Buenos Aires, which
amended the OAS Charter, changed the legal status of the Declaration to an
instrument that, at the very least, constitutes an authoritative interpretation and
definition of the human rights obligations binding on OAS member states under
the Charter of the Organization.
Id.
71. Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man Within
the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion
OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 10, 1 17 (July 14, 1989), available at
http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4j.htm [hereinafter Interpretation of the American
Declaration].
72. See Inadmissibility Report, 12.379 Mario Alfredo Lares-Reyes et. al., Feb. 27 (2002)
31, availableat http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.12379.htm.
73. Out of thirty-four O.A.S. Member States, ten have not ratified the American
Convention, notably the United States, Canada, Belize, and Cuba (the latter only recently
readmitted to the O.A.S. in 2009 through resolution AG/RES. 2438 (XXXIX-O/09), plus other
Caribbean states: Antigua and Barbuda, The Bahamas (Commonwealth of), Guyana, Saint
Lucia, Saint Kitts and Nevis, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). General Information on the
Convention, supra note 8. Because all O.A.S. members must ratify the OAS Charter in order to
be members of the organization, they are deemed to be covered by the American Declaration
also, which interprets the O.A.S. Charter. See Interpretation of the American Declaration, infra
note 71, 43.
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communications contained the petitioners' and the U.S. Government's
positions as follows.
Regarding the American Declaration, the petitioners pointed out that
the Declaration's travaux prdparatoires, that is, the discussion of the
draft Declaration during the IX International Conference of American
States at Bogota in 1948 demonstrated that the Member States' intent
was to protect the right to life from the moment of conception. 74 The
U.S. State Department argued that, during the Declaration's drafting, at
the Bogoth conference, the members specifically rejected the
application of the right to life before birth.75
Even though the United States is not a party to the American
Convention, and the State Department itself emphasized this fact, the
government opined on what the appropriate interpretation of the
Convention would be. 7 6 It stated that Article 4(1) of the Convention
should be interpreted to mean that the phrase "in general," included in
the drafting sessions in San Jos6, allowed for the possibility of States
Parties to legalize "the most diverse cases of abortion" at the domestic
level. This argument had been previously proposed and rejected at the
San Jos6 Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights,
where States Parties approved the American Convention's final text, by
the Brazilian delegate, Carlos Dunshee;78 nevertheless, the State
Department relied on it for its defense. The government communication
also alleged that in November 1969, during the second plenary session
of the San Jos6 Conference, the U.S. and Brazilian delegations placed
the following statement on the record: "[t]he United States and Brazil
interpret the language of paragraph I of Article 4 as preserving to State
Parties discretion with respect to the content of legislation in the light of
their own social development, experience and similar factors." 79
Although this was a general statement unrelated to abortion, the State
Department, in Baby Boy, alleged it meant to address the
incompatibility of their abortion legislation with Article 4 of the
American Convention. This was a misleading assertion, because the
United States created a federal "right" to abortion only in 1973, not in
1969.
The petitioners subsequently argued that the records of the Ninth
International Conference of American States proved that the term "life"
74. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1,118.
75. Id. 14(a).
76. See id. 14(b)-(c).
77. Id. 14(c).
78. Id. 20, 25-27.
79. Id. 14 (citing Conferencia Especializada Interamericana sobre Derechos Humanos,
Acta de la segunda sesi6n plenaria, OEA/Ser.KIXVI/1.2, at 6, 6 (Nov. 7-22, 1969)).
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in Article 1 of the Declaration of Bogota of 1948 on human rights and
duties was, in fact, defined by the drafters and promulgators of that
Declaration so as to protect the individual's right to life "from the
moment of conception."80 They also contended that Roe v. Wade 8
allowed for unborn children's "arbitrary deprivation of life, 82 in
contravention of Article I of the Declaration, to be interpreted in
connection with Article 4 of the Convention. They stated that the U.S.
Supreme Court had sanctioned the arbitrary killing of human fetuses
during the first six months of development by stating that the woman's
right is absolute and that she is entitled to terminate her pregnancy at
whatever time, in whatever way, and for whatever reason she alone
chooses. 83
The State Department countered that in Roe v. Wade 84 and Doe v.
Bolton,8 5 the Supreme Court had protected the woman's right to
privacy, deemed a fundamental right in the United States, implicitly
enshrined in the Fourteenth amendment of the U.S. Constitution.8 6 The
State Department affirmed that the Court found that abortion
prohibitions limited the exercise of the fundamental right to privacy in a
manner inconsistent with "compelling state interests" that could justify
the regulation of that right.
On July 27, 1979, Thomas Y. Yank, Henry Y. Hyde, Charles F.
Dougherty and Daniel E. Tungren, members of the U.S. House of
Representatives and right to life advocates, requested that the
Commission inform them about related consequences of an eventual
adverse decision of the Commission against the United States.8 8 Perhaps
candidly overestimating the political power of the IACHR, the
congressmen posed the question whether the United States could be
subject to trade and diplomatic sanctions similar to those imposed upon
Cuba by the O.A.S. following the human rights violations of the Castro
regime, should the Commission find a violation of the Declaration. 89
Evidently, the United States and Cuba had quite different standings
within the O.A.S. Thus, in virtue of Article 18 of the IACHR's statute,
the Commission declined to answer this consultation, invoking a
procedural requirement that consultations be presented through the State
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. 3-15.
Id. 14-15.
Id. T 15
Id.
Id.
Id.117.
Id. 115.
Id.
Id. 19.
Id.
Id. 13.
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Party's delegation before the O.A.S. in order for them to be
considered. 91
C. A Suspect Appointment
In its Fiftieth Session period (September-October 1980), the
Commission appointed former Commissioner, Carlos A. Dunshee, a
Brazilian national, as a "rapporteur" whose sole task would be to draft
the majority resolution on the petition, 92 a highly irregular treatment for
petitions in general. 93 No justification was given as to why the
Commissioners found it necessary or convenient to appoint a
"rapporteur" to draft the resolution, contrary to usual practice. No
explanation was provided as to why Carlos Dunshee, in particular, was
chosen to write a report on a subject in which he had proven bias and a
clear conflict of interest.
Dunshee, a former Commissioner from 1964 to 1983, during the
Convention's adoption, had a history of attempting to undermine the
American Convention's protection of the right to life from conception.
During the internal debate at the Commission, he proposed that the draft
article on the right to life (Article 2) be amended to eliminate all
protection from conception by suggesting the deletion of the phrase
"from the moment of conception," allegedly because including a right to
life protection for the unborn child. He first attempted to disentitle the
unborn child from right to life protection in 1969, during the
preparatory work of the American Convention. A member of the
IACHR at the time, Dunshee took part in an evaluation of the InterAmerican Council of Jurists' draft for the American Convention. 94
During the internal debate at the Commission, he proposed that the draft
article on the right to life be amended to eliminate all protection from
conception by suggesting the deletion of the phrase "from the moment
of conception," 95 allegedly because including a right to life protection
for the unborn child would have created conflict with Article 6(1) of the
U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 96 The rest of the
Commission members, however, rejected his suggestion and chose to
keep the wording "from the moment of conception," believing that, "for
reasons of principle, it was fundamental to state the provision on the
91. Id. f 12-14.
92. Id. 20.
93. IACHR reports or resolutions are usually drafted by staff members in conjunction
with the Commissioners themselves.
94. Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 97 (1968); General Secretariat of the
O.A.S., Washington, D.C. (1973).
95. See Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.LN/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 126.
96. See id.
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protection of the right to life" in the form recommended by the
Council.9 7
Later, in the following year, acting not as a Commissioner, but as a
representative for the government of Brazil at the San Jos6 Conference
that approved the final text of the American Convention, he again
proposed that States Parties eliminate right to life protection for the
unborn child by deleting the expression "in general, from the moment of
conception" from the text, in order to allow for individual states to
legalize abortion in "a great variety of cases." 98 His proposal was also
rejected at that stage.
Even though his obvious lack of impartiality regarding abortion and
the unborn child's right to life clearly constituted a conflict of interest,
his appointment as rapporteur went unchallenged, inevitably tainting the
Commission resolution's legitimacy.
D. A Resolution with Biased and PredictableResults
Predictably, the Baby Boy Commission concluded that the United
States had not violated Baby Boy's right to life under the American
Declaration or the American Convention either in Roe v. Wade 99 or in
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Kenneth Edelin. 00 In other words,
it concluded that legalization of voluntary abortion was compatible with
the American Declaration and, incidentally, the American Convention.
Regarding the American Declaration, the Commission relied entirely
on the U.S. Government's selective interpretation of the Declaration's
preparatory work, specifically, on the Bogoth Conference's changes to
Article 1, claiming that the specific reference to the unborn had been
removed from the initial draft's list because States Parties specifically
wanted to exclude unborn children from right to life protection in order
to preserve, implement, or expand their legalization of abortion at the
time.1o' The resolution held that the reference to the right to life from
conception had been eliminated from the Declaration's final text as a
"compromise" with several states that had legalized some forms of
voluntary abortion at the time, such as abortion in cases of rape, fetal
disability, endangerment of the mother's life, a mother's poverty, and
even a mother's "honor,"l 02 in order to avoid incompatibilities with
97. Id. 27.
98. Actas y Documentos of the Interamerican Specialized Conference on Human Rights,
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2, 121 (Nov. 7-22, 1969), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/
15388.pdf (unofficial translation) [hereinafter Actas y Documentos].
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/VIII.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 1 19(h).
102. Id. I 19(e).
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domestic laws. The supposed states were: Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the
United States, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.10 3
Incidentally, the resolution also delved into an interpretation of
Article 4(1) of the American Convention, even though it had
acknowledged its inapplicability to the United States and had refused to
read the American Declaration in light of the Convention, as requested
by the petitioners,'1' and eventually concluded that the Convention did
not grant unborn children an "absolute" right to life.'s It stated that the
Convention's phrase "in general" was introduced deliberately to allow a
right to life exception for the voluntary abortion of unborn children,
consistent with the supposed objections raised since the Declaration's
adoption at the BogotA Conference.1 06 The Commission also concluded
that all other violations alleged by the petitioners, that is, Articles II
(right to equality before law), VII (right to special protection for
mothers and children), and XI (right to the preservation of health and to
well-being) of the American Declaration, had "no direct relation to the
facts set forth in the petition," and dismissed them without further
examination.1 0 7
IV. A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF BABYBOY AND ITS PREMISES
The resolution in Baby Boy,o presented two major flaws: the
violation of international rules of interpretation and the
misrepresentation of States Parties' original intent when adopting the
American Declaration and Convention. It is therefore unsurprising that
three separate opinions followed, evincing the lack of consensus among
the Commissioners.1 09

103. Id. I 19(f).
104. Id. 31.
105. Id. 19(e).
106. Id. T25.
107. Id. 33.
108. Id. 14-15.
109. There were two dissenting opinions and a concurring opinion, in which
Commissioner Andr6s Aguilar hinted at having reservations about Professor Dunshee's
interpretation of the travaux prdparatoires, adopted by the Commission. See id. at the
Concurring Opinion of Dr. Andres Aguilar, 8; but see id. 7 (Commissioner Aguilar defended
the resolution by stating that article 4 only protects life from the moment of birth, in spite of the
fact that the state parties specifically included the word "conception" in the final draft); see also
id. 1 8 (Commissioner Aguilar finished his concurring opinion by contradicting his previous
argumentation and stating that he shared the dissenting judges' opinions, "based [on] the
opinions of well-known men of science, that human life begins at the very moment of
conception and ought to warrant complete protection from that moment, both in domestic law as
well as international law").
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A. States Parties' OriginalIntent Behind the American
Declarationand Convention
1. The Explicit Right to Life of "Those Who are Not Yet Born," "From
the Moment of Conception" in the Draft American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man
Latin American States intended to include human rights protection
for the unborn child from the very first steps of the American
Declaration's preparatory work. Pursuant to Resolution XL of the InterAmerican Conference on Problems of War and Peace (Mexico, 1945),
the Inter-American Juridical Committee of Rio de Janeiro formulated a
preliminary draft of an American Declaration on Human Rights." 0 As a
result, the Ninth International Conference of American States in BogotA
(1948) adopted the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man.
The Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) was being
drafted at the same time and informed the Inter-American Juridical
Committee's work. Scholars have pointed out that, since the UDHR's
inception, Latin American states contributed to international human
rights law by emphasizing the dignity of the person from conception,
and the importance of the family.' Professor Mary Ann Glendon
indicates that Latin American contributions to the UDHR in 1948 were
among the major factors that helped the U.N. General Assembly avoid
extremes of individualism or collectivism and to become a model for
the majority of international human rights instruments.112 Rita Joseph,
an Australian scholar, holds that from the drafting history of the UDHR
and the American Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of
Man, drafted almost simultaneously, the unborn child was included in
Latin American states' understanding of the right to life, and that this
consensual understanding pertained right through to the American
Convention on Human Rights.113 For instance, during the adoption of
the UDHR's text, Hernin Santacruz, a leftist leader from Chile, the
principal advocate of social and economic rights in the Human Rights
Commission, proposed the following amendment to the UDHR's article
on the right to life: "unborn children and incurables, mentally defectives
and lunatics, shall have the right to life."' 'l4
Similarly, draft Article I of the American Declaration submitted by
110. See id $ 19(a) (majority opinion).
111. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten Crucible: The Latin American Influence on
the UniversalHuman Rights Idea, 16 HARv. HuM. RTs. J. 27, 36 (2003).
112. Id. at 39.
113.

RITA JOSEPH, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNBORN CHILD 218 (2009).

114.

Glendon, supra note 111, at 36.
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the Juridical Committee in 1947 read: "[e]very person has the right to
life, including those who are not yet born[,] as well as the incurable, the
insane, and the mentally retarded.""' At the Bogotd Conference, a
Working Group amended the Committee's draft Article I as follows:
"[e]very human being has the right to life, liberty, security and integrity
of this person," thus removing the section that stated that "[t]his right
extends to the right to life from the moment of conception; to the right
to life of incurables, imbeciles and the insane. Capital punishment may
only be applied in cases in which it has been prescribed by pre-existing
law for crimes of exceptional gravity[,]" and adding the right to liberty,
security, and personal integrity.116 On April 30, 1948, the Seventh
Plenary session of the Conference removed the word "integrity," and
approved the final text of Article I establishing a right to life, liberty,
and personal security." 7 The Final Act was signed on May 2, 1948.' 18
In Baby Boy," 9 the U.S. State Department alleged that the deletion
of that paragraph constituted a showing of the States Parties' intent to
exclude the protection of life from conception. The Commission echoed
this sentiment, asserting that these changes constituted a political
compromise to resolve alleged incompatibility between the
Committee's draft and domestic laws permitting abortion in limited
circumstances in Argentina, Brazil, Cuba, the United States, Mexico,
Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.120 The resolution eventually concluded
the new drafting demonstrated the intent to exclude the unborn child
from human rights protection from abortion.' 2 1 However, a closer
examination of the Commission's conclusions demonstrates that these
arguments were based on incorrect factual information and self-serving
arguments, designed to produce a predetermined conclusion that the
Declaration did not prohibit the United States from legalizing voluntary
abortion.
First, in reality, no delegations actually raised objections or
amendment proposals for this article on account of legalized abortion,
as indicated by the majority opinion in Baby Boy. 12 2 The dissents of
Commissioners Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra and Luis Demetrio
Tinoco Castro found no evidence of such objections or any other
legislative history that would warrant a conclusion that states meant to
115. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.LN/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 14(a) (citing Actas y Documentos,
supra note 98, at 449).
116. Id. f 19(b).
117. Id. I 19(g).
118. Id.
119. Id. T 19(h).
120. Id.I19(d).
121. Id. I 19(h).
122. See id. 3 (Dr. Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro, dissenting).
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disentitle unborn children from the right to life in the womb. 123
Commissioner Tinoco, in his dissenting opinion, indicated that he found
no evidence, that is, "no mention whatever" of the said political
compromise, problems or objections in the minutes of the Working
Group, of the Sixth Committee, or of the plenary session of the
Conference that met in Bogot. 12 No motion or written draft by any
delegation explicitly requesting the elimination of that phrase from the
Juridical Council's draft could be found either. Neither the Report, the
Minutes or Documents of the Working Group, 125 nor the Report of the
Sixth Committee,126 as they appear in Actas y Documentos of the Ninth
International Conference of American States, provided "any specific
explanation of the reasons that motivated the elimination of the
supplementary phrase" contained in the Draft Declaration of the
International Rights and Duties of Man presented by the Inter-American
Juridical Committee,12 7 which recognized "the right to life for all
persons, including (a) the unborn, as well as (a) 'incurables, imbeciles,
and the insane.'
Second, as Commissioner Monroy Cabra pointed out, the
Conference records are silent on the reason for removing the said
phrases.1 29 His examination of the travaux prdparatoires yielded no
evidence whatsoever that the removal of that phrase was motivated by
an intent to protect life from the moment of birth only, "much less to
allow abortion."l 30 He also mentioned the topic of abortion was not
addressed at all during the BogotA conference, contrary to the majority's
assertions,' 3given
that, at the time, the biological, scientific fact that
life begins at conception was not a matter of great controversy among
Latin American states.132 Commissioner Tinoco further explained that
the agreement on the unborn child's entitlement to the right to life at the
time of the Declaration's drafting was so complete, that it "was not
discussed or put in doubt by anyone."l33
Both Commissioner Monroy and Commissioner Tinoco pointed out
that just as the deletion of the phrase "this right extends to the right to
life from the moment of conception to the right to life of incurables,
imbeciles, and the insane" cannot reasonably lead to a conclusion that
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

See id.; see also id. 3 (Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, dissenting).
See id. 1 3 (Dr. Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro, dissenting).
Id. (citing Actas y Documentos, supra note 98, at 472-78, 510-16).
Id.
Id.
See id.
See id. 2 (Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, dissenting).
See id.
Id.
Id.
See id. 3 (Dr. Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro, dissenting).
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states did not intend to protect the life of the disabled, neither can the
mere deletion of the sentence warrant a presumption that States Parties
rejected the Inter-American Juridical Committee's proposal to protect

unborn children.134
Third, Commissioner Tinoco stated that the true reason for the
elimination of the unborn (as well as the "imbeciles and mentally
weak") from the final draft of the American Declaration was meant to
refrain from giving exhaustive lists of protected categories under Article
I, as expressed by the Sixth Committee Rapporteur, Mr. Lopez de Mesa,
in these terms: "likewise, it was decided to draft them (the rights and
duties) in their mere essence, without exemplary or restrictive listings,
which carry with them the risk of useless diffusion and of the dangerous
confusion of their limits."' 3 5 Thus, it was the need for conciseness and
inclusiveness, rather than exclusivity, that accounted for dropping the
specific inclusion of unborn children and the mentally disabled from
Article I of the American Declaration.136
After Baby Boy, some commentators have agreed with the dissenting
opinions in this regard. Professor Dinah Shelton, for instance, pointed
out that it is, in fact, impossible to determine the motivation for the
change from reading the travaux pr6paratoires.' 3 7 Rita Joseph pointed
out that in the 1947 Draft American Declaration, the phrase "and
women" was considered briefly for addition to certain articles but
ultimately rejected.' 3 8 Obviously, the fact that the language was not
adopted does not lead to an unwarranted exclusion of women, together
with the unborn, the mentally defective, and the insane from the
protection of their rights under the Declaration. 19 Likewise, the
removal of the word "integrity" does not lead to the assumption that

134. See id. T 4.
135. See id. 1 2. Dr. Castro also wrote:
Now: if the elimination of the phrase that concerns those persons has no other
moral, logical, and legal justification than the purpose of the Sixth
Committee-and later of the plenary session of the Conference-to avoid
"exemplary or restrictive listings," for the same reason it is necessary to admit
that it was the purpose of avoiding its "listing"-and no other-that led the
Committee and the Conference also to eliminate the unnecessarily explanatory
expression "the right to life from the moment of conception."
Id.
136. See id. T 2 (citing Actas y Documentos,supra note 98, at, 472-78, 510-16).
137. SHELTON, supra note 10, at 3. See also Dinah Shelton, Abortion and Right to Life in
the Inter-American System: The Case of Baby Boy, 2 HuM. RTs. L.J. 309, 313 (1981)
[hereinafter Shelton, Abortion and Right to Life].
138. JOSEPH, supranote 113, at 233.
139. Id.
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states wanted the right to personal integrity unrecognized in the
American Declaration. 40
Both the dissents of Commissioners Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra
and Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro agreed with the view that when
Article I of the American Declaration protects the right to life of "every
human being," it also protects human life from the moment of
conception, and that abortion, particularly the one committed on Baby
Boy, effectively violated the American Declaration.141 Commissioner
Tinoco, for instance, found it self-evident that the Declaration also
protected life from conception. He stated that, "life does not begin at
birth--the final phase of the process of gestation-but at the moment of
conception, which is the moment at which a new human being, distinct
from the father and from the mother, is formed . .. [,]" and that "in

recognizing the right of the unborn to life, the Declaration rejects the
legitimacy of any act that authorizes or considers acceptable acts or
practices that will lead to its death."1 42
Commissioner Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra articulated that,
according to the Declaration, "the life of the unborn child, the infant, the
young, the old, the mentally ill, the handicapped, and that of all human
beings in general, must be recognized."' He referred to scientific
evidence, such as the studies by geneticist Jdrome Lejeune,
demonstrating that the fetus is a human being and is genetically
complete.144 He also referred to Roman Law precedents granting unborn
children inheritance rightsl 45 and concluded that the voluntary
interruption of pregnancy resulting in the destruction of the embryo or
death of the fetus, like the one that ended the life of Baby Boy, "is
unquestionably an offense against life and, consequently, a violation of
Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man." 46 Finally, Cabra stated that "[iln terminating legal protection of
unborn children, the judicial decision of the [United States] constitutes a
violation of Article 1 of the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man." 47
140. Id. at 218.
141. See Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 9 (Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy
Cabra, dissenting); see also id. 1 12 (Dr. Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro, dissenting).
Commissioner [Monroy] Cabra stated that abortion was an "attack on the right to life." Id. 1 9
(Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, dissenting). Castro indicated the Declaration "rejects the
legitimacy of any act that authorizes or considers acceptable acts or practices that will lead to its
death." Id 12 (Dr. Luis Tinoco Castro, dissenting).
142. Id.
143. Id. 9 (Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, dissenting).
144. See id. $$ 5, 8.
145. Id. 7.
146. Id. 8.
147. Id.
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a. Errors of Fact in Analysis of 1946 Latin American Criminal Codes
Because the Commission had no evidence that the states actually
intended to deprive the unborn child from a right to life from conception
during the Declaration's travaux prdparatoires,1 48 it produced the
following list of selected articles from several Latin American Criminal
Codes in force in 1946,149 presumably demonstrating that several
nations excluded criminal sanctions for the crime of abortion under
some circumstances at the time of the American Declaration's adoption.
The following list was presented as supposed evidence that States
Parties intentionally intended to exclude unborn children from right to
life protection and to preserve, implement, or expand their legalization
of abortion at the time of the American Declaration's signature:1 50
Argentina-article 86 n.1, 2 (cases A and B); Bra[z]il-article
n.I, I (A and B); Costa Rica-article 199 (A); Cuba-article 443
(A, B, and D); Ecuador-article 423 n.1, 2 (A and B); Mexico
("Distrito y Territorios Federales")-articles 333e 334 (A and B);
Nicaragua-article article 399 (frustrated attempt) (C);
Paraguay-article 352 (A); Peru-article 163 (A-to save the life
or health of the mother); Uruguay-article 328 n. 1-5 (A, B, C[],
and F-the abortion must be performed in the three first months
from conception); Venezuela-article 435 (A); United States of
America-see the State laws and precedents; Puerto Rico S S
266, 267 (A).'
Several factual errors stand out from the Commission's list. The
most obvious among them being that Puerto Rico is not, and was not at
the time, an independent state nor a member of the O.A.S., nor a party
to the American Convention.
Another incorrect assertion was that the United States had legalized
abortion at the time of the Declaration's preparatory work, in 1946-

148.
149.

See id. 19(e) (majority opinion).
Id. I 19(f).

150.

See Luis JIMfNEZ DE ASUA, C6DIGOs PENALES IBEROAMERICANOS (Andrds Bello, ed.),

vols. I, II) (1946) [hereinafter C6DIGOS].
151. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 9, rev. 1, $ 19(f). A present day analysis would also
include Barbados (ratified the Convention in 1981), Dominica (ratified Convention in 1993),
Grenada (ratified the Convention in 1978), Jamaica (ratified the Convention in 1978), Suriname
(ratified the Convention on 11/12/87), and Trinidad and Tobago (ratified the Convention on
04/03/91). General Information on the Convention, supra note 8.
152. See IACHR, Basic Documents Pertainingto Human Rights in the Inter-American
(last visited
System, http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basicl/.%20Intro.htm#_ftnref5
Apr. 17, 2011).
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1948.153 It is a well-known fact that the United States had not yet
legalized abortion in 1948, but only much later in 1973, through the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade. In 1946, the year in
which Dunshee's research focused, abortion was criminalized in the
great majority of American states. 15 4 Many states passed full bans on
abortion between 1860 and 1950.155 Some states, like Connecticut and
New York, penalized the procedure even earlier, in 1821 and 1828.156 In
1859, the American Medical Association condemned abortion as an
unethical practice.157 In the two decades following this declaration,

thirty-one states made abortion illegal.1s By 1910 every state had
explicit laws or court decisions prohibiting abortion. 15 While the states'
abortion laws were far from uniform, they consistently forbade abortion.
The greatest variation was not in what types of abortions were
forbidden, but in what the penalties were. These typically included
fines, as well as prison sentences ranging from less than one year, to as
many as fourteen years.160
Vital facts were conveniently left out of the resolution in an attempt
to obscure the legislative intent behind the American Declaration and
the American Convention: At the time of the Declaration's adoption, all
Latin American 1946 Criminal Codes examined by Dunshee
contemplated abortion as a crime and established serious criminal
penalties, such as prison sentences for both the abortionist who
performed the abortion and, sometimes to a lesser extent, the woman
who aborted her unborn child, as described below. Late-term abortion
was usually considered infanticide, and punished accordingly. 16 1
Abortionists, including physicians, surgeons, midwives, and
pharmacists, could get their licenses suspended or permanently
revoked. 162 Many Latin American criminal codes included fetal
homicide provisions, which applied to those who indirectly caused a
153. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 18.
154. See id. 18(b)(e).
155. Id.
156. Zoila Acevedo, Abortion in Early America, 4 WOMEN & HEALTH 159-67 (1979).
157. See Brian Young, Life Before Roe, A Brief Survey of U.S. Abortion Law before the
1973 Decision (1995), availableat http://www.ewtn.com/library/PROLIFE/LIFBFROE.TXT.
158. See id
159. Id.
160. Edwin M. Schur, Legal Aspects of Abortion in the United States, presentation at
PlannedParenthoodFederationof American Conference (1955), availableat http://realchoice.
Ocatch.conlibrary/ppfa55/bl55ppfa3a.htm.
161. For instance, criminal codes in Argentina (art. 81(2)), Brazil (art. 123), Colombia (art.
369), Costa Rica (art. 187), Guatemala (303), and Peru (art. 155) cited below punish partialbirth abortion as homicide.
162. See, e.g., criminal codes of Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Peru, and Venezuela cited below.
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miscarriage or abortion through acts of violence against a pregnant
woman, usually if her state of pregnancy was visible or the perpetrator
was aware of it.1 63 Civil and criminal penalties also applied for botched
abortions, and to those who unsuccessfully attempted to perform them,
as illustrated below.
Protection of the unborn child's right to life in 1946 included the
human embryo. For instance, Cuba's Criminal Code' 64 criminalized not
only abortion, but the "destruction of the embryo" through any
means. 165 In addition, a prohibition of abortifacient drugs, and criminal
penalties for pharmacists who prescribed or administered them, existed
in Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Puerto Rico, and Venezuela. Likewise, the Chilean Criminal Code
prohibited the execution of pregnant women, and went so far as to
prohibit notification of the death sentence to the woman up to forty days
after the delivery of her unborn child, in an attempt to protect the child's
life and health, a miscarriage, or lactation anomalies caused by severe
stress.166 Similar provisions existed in El Salvador's Criminal code, as
well as Ecuador's. 167 Venezuela provided that any kind of criminal
penalty be deferred for at least six months when such penalty would
endanger the pregnant woman's life or health, "as well as the life or
health of the child she carries in her womb."16 8
Upon a closer examination of the sources cited by the resolution's
author, particularly the compilation of Latin American Criminal Codes
entitled C6digos Penales Iberoamericanos,169 it may be observed that
most countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, El Salvador, and the United
States) punished all forms of abortion and allowed absolutely no
exceptions to the crime in 1946.170 It is noteworthy that all of the
following 1946 Criminal Code provisions can be found under the rightto-life chapters dealing with homicide, murder, and manslaughter,

163. See criminal codes of Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Chile, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru Uruguay, and Venezuela cited below.
164. See CODIGOS, supra note 150, at 947-48, SOCIAL DEFENSE CODE OF CUBA, tit. IX.,
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH AND BODILY INTEGRITY, arts. 439-443.

165. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, at 947-48, SOCIAL DEFENSE CODE OF CUBA, tit. IX.,
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH AND BODILY INTEGRITY, arts. 439-443.
166. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, at 1092-93, CRIMINAL CODE OF CHILE, CRIMES
AGAINST THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC MORALITY, vol. II, tit. VII, 1 II, arts. 342-345.
167. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, CRIMINAL CODE OF ECUADOR, CRIMES AGAINST
PERSONS, vol. II, tit. VI, ch. I, arts. 417-423, 690, CRIMINAL CODE OF EL SALVADOR, vol. II, tit.
VIII, ch. V, CRIMES AGAINST PERSON arts. 374-377, vol. II.
168. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, CRIMINAL CODE OF VENZUELA art. 47.
169. C6DIGOS, supra note 150.
170. Id.
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usually entitled "crimes against life," "crimes against persons," or
"crimes against the family."
Argentina: Articles 85 to 88 of the Argentinean Criminal Code 7 1
punished anyone who would cause an abortion, whether forced or
voluntary, with up to ten years of prison. The Code also provided for a
sentence of one to four years of prison for a woman who voluntarily
aborted her unborn child.172 Abortionists, including physicians,
midwives or pharmacists who "abused their expertise" by "causing or
cooperating in causing" an abortion would be sanctioned with
imprisonment as well as the revocation of their license to practice their
profession.17 3 The Code also included a fetal homicide provision
penalizing the death of the unborn child upon the commission of acts of
*
174
violence against
a pregnant woman.
Bolivia: the Bolivian Criminal Code
banned abortion under all
circumstances. Fetal homicide, intentional or unintentional, was
punishable from two to four years of prison.1 7 6 Procured abortion
carried a prison penalty of two to ei&4t years for abortionists and 1 to 2
years for the woman in question.
Even cases of failed abortions
carried penalties of community service for physicians, surgeons,
pharmacists, or midwives who facilitated an abortion in any way, as
well as a permanent revocation of their license to practice their
178
profession or occupation.
Brazil: Articles 123 to 129 of the Criminal Code' 7 9 proscribed
abortion, and established penalties of up to ten years in prison, both for
the abortionist who performed the abortion and for the woman who
consented to it. Partial-birth abortion was considered infanticide and
was penalized with up to six years imprisonment.' 8 0 Physical assault
deriving in miscarriage or even induced labor was sanctioned with up to
8 years deprivation of liberty.'' Likewise, the advertisement of
contraceptive or abortive methods, substances or objects directed to
causing an abortion or termination of pregnancy, was heavily penalized
171. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF ARGENTINA,
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, Bk. II, tit. I, at 433-35.

172.

Id.

173.

Id.

174. Id.
175. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, at 568-69, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF
BOLIVIA, CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS, Bk. III, tit. I, arts. 516-518.

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, at 626-27, CRIMINAL CODE OF BRAZIL, CRIMES
AGAINST LIFE, SPECIAL SECTION, tit. I.

180. Id.
181. Id.
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with fines.182 Even failed abortions could lead to prison time or fines for
those who performed them.183
Colombia: the Colombian Criminal Code' 8 4 banned all forms of
abortion without exception. It provided for criminal penalties of up to
six years imprisonment for women who procured an abortion and for
anyone who aided them in committing the crime.' 85 Forced abortion
carried a more severe penalty of up to six years.' 86 Aggravating
circumstances included the abortionist being a physician, surgeon,
pharmacist, or midwife, which increased the penalty an additional onethird of jail time at sentencing.' 87 Such abortionists would suffer
suspension of their professional license for up to six years.' 8 8
Costa Rica: the Costa Rican Criminal Code' 89 penalized individuals
who committed abortions with up to twelve years of imprisonment.
Procured abortion entailed a penalty of up to three years for the woman
who obtained it. 190 In addition, a one to four year suspension of
professional license for physicians or midwives who performed
abortions would apply.' 9 ' Fetal homicide during acts of violence against
a pregnant woman was penalized with up to three years
imprisonment.' 9 2
Cuba: Cuba's Criminal Code, denominated the Social Defense Code
of Cuba,193 criminalized not only procured abortion, but the "destruction
of the embryo" through any means, and established penalties of up to
twelve years (similar to penalties for homicide) for either voluntary or
forced abortion.194 The Code uses the terms "embryo destruction" at
least three times in different articles, hand in hand with the term
"abortion."' 95 The physician, surgeon, pharmacist, or midwife, as well
as the woman who aborted her child were subject to criminal penalties
of up to three years imprisonment.14 6 Fetal homicide was punished in
182.
183.

Id.
See id at 672-73, CRIMINAL FELONIES ACT, arts. 20,21.

184.

Id.

at 386-89, CRIMINAL CODE OF COLOMBIA, tit. XV, CRIMES AGAINST LIFE AND

PERSONAL INTEGRITY.

185.

Id

186. Id.
187. Id
188. Id.
189. Id. at 774, CRIMINAL CODE OF COSTA RICA, CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS, bk. II, tit. I, ch.
II, arts. 193-99.
190. Id.
19 1. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 947-48, SOCIAL DEFENSE CODE OF CUBA, tit. IX, CRIMES AGAINST LIFE, HEALTH
AND BODILY INTEGRITY, arts. 439-43.

194.

Id.

195.

Id.

196.

Id.
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the same manner.197 Pharmacists or those performing such functions
who dispensed or facilitated an abortifacient drug, or a substance that
would effectively destroy the embryo would be subject to criminal and

civil sanctions.19

Chile: the Criminal Code of Chile' 99 proscribed abortion in all cases,
without exceptions. Jail penalties applied for those who committed
forced or voluntary abortions, as well as for women who procured
abortions.2 0 0 Criminal sanctions applied for fetal homicide as well.2 0 1
Dominican Republic: criminal law banned all forms of abortion and
allowed no exceptions for legal abortion. The Criminal Code of the
Dominican Republic 20 2 provided for prison penalties for anyone who
caused an abortion by means of food, drink, drugs, or any other way.
The same penalty applied for the woman who consented to it.
Physicians, surgeons and other sanitary authorities were punished with
community service. 203
Ecuador: the Criminal Code of Ecuador 204 also provided for prison
penalties of up to six years for anyone who caused an abortion through
food, drink, drugs, or violence. Fetal homicide perpetrators would face
up to five years imprisonment; the same penalty applied to both the
abortionist and the woman who procured her abortion. 20 Additional
criminal penalties for physicians, pharmacists, or medical students who
performed or facilitated abortions were established.2 06
El Salvador: El Salvadorian criminal law prohibited all forms of
abortion.207 Abortion was a crime, subject to penalties of up to six years
imprisonment to abortionists and three years for the woman who
aborted.2 08 Fetal homicide was punishable with a two-year sentence.209
Aggravating factors included abortionists being health care
professionals. Causation or cooperation in abortion was also

197.
198.

Id.
Id.

199.

Id. at 1092-93, CRIMINAL CODE OF CHILE, CRIMES AGAINST THE FAMILY AND PUBLIC

MORALITY, vol. II, tit. VII, II, arts. 342-45.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150, at 1166, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC,
CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS, vol. III, tit. II, ch. I, art. 317.

203.

Id.

204.

Id. at 1260-61, CRIMINAL CODE OF ECUADOR, CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS, vol. II, tit.

VI, ch. I, arts. 417-23.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207.

See CODIGOS, supra note 150, at 690, CRIMINAL CODE OF EL SALVADOR, vol. II, tit.

VIII, ch. V, CRIMES AGAINST PERSONS, arts. 374-377, vol. II.
208. Id.
209. Id.
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penalized. 210 A pharmacist who prescribed abortifacients incurred in a
penalty of one-year imprisonment and suspension of professional
practice during the same period.
21
Guatemala: the Guatemalan Criminal Code2 12 banned all abortions
without exception, and established penalties for women and abortionists
who engaged in either forced or procured abortion (up to six years
imprisonment). Penalties applied to anyone who cooperated in causing
an abortion, including pharmacists who prescribed abortifacients.2 13
Haiti: the Haitian Criminal Code2 14 prohibited all abortions without
exception, and prescribed equal imprisonment penalties for both the
abortionist and the woman who procured the abortion of her unborn
child. Criminal penalties were also imposed against physicians,
surgeons, health care staff, or pharmacists who prescribed or
administered abortifacients, including forced labor among others.2 15
Honduras: the Honduran Criminal Code2?6 established equal
imprisonment penalties for a woman who aborted and the abortionist,
even when the procedure was voluntary. Stringent penalties were
applied if abortion was forced. The Code included fetal homicide
provisions. 217 Penalties were also applied to pharmacists who dispensed

abortifacients. 2 18

Mexico: the Mexican Criminal Code, 2 19 Article 329, defined
abortion as "the death of the product of conception" at any stage of the
pregnancy. Procured abortion was criminalized with one to eight years
imprisonment for the abortionist, and up to five years imprisonment for
the woman.220 Abortionists faced suspension of their professional
221
practice from two to five years.221
Nicaragua: the Criminal Code of Nicaragua2 2 2 provided for
imprisonment measures for both the woman who procured an abortion,
as well as her abortionist. Suspension of professional license in
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1340-41, CRIMINAL CODE OF GUATEMALA, CRIMES AGAINST LIFE AND BODILY
INTEGRITY, vol. II, tit. VII, arts. 304-307.

213. Id
214. Id. at 36.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 125, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF HONDURAS, vol. 11, tit. IX, CRIMES
AGAINST PERSONS, vol. II, arts. 409-12.

217. Id.
2 18. Id.
219. Id. at 212, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF MEXICO, vol. II, tit. XX, ch. VI,
CRIMES AGAINST LIFE AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY vol. II, arts. 329-34.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 296-97, CRIMINAL CODE OF NICARAGUA, vol. II, tit. IX, CRIMES AGAINST THE
FAMILY AND PUBLIC MORALITY, arts. 398-402, vol. II.
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maximum degree applied for physicians, surgeons, midwives, or
pharmacists who aided in abortion. 223 Unauthorized fabrication,
prescription of abortifacient drugs, or beverages were punished with
imprisonment and suspension of professional practice. 224 Forced
abortion carried a penalty equivalent to homicide. 225 Article 401
included fetal homicide provisions and imprisonment for acts of
violence against pregnant women.226
Panama: All forms of abortion were banned in the Panamanian
Criminal Code in 1946.227 The Code prohibited procured abortion and
punished both the woman who aborted her unborn child and abortionists
with up to seven years deprivation of liberty. 22 8 Aggravating factors
included a husband provoking an abortion on his pregnant wife, or a
healthcare professional performing the abortion. 229
Paraguay: the Criminal Code2 30 prohibited abortion and established
penalties of up to thirty months in prison for both the abortionist and the
woman who aborted her unborn child. Manufacturers, pharmacists, or
salesmen who provided abortifacients were subject to an equal penalty
and civil fines.2 3 ' Greater fines applied for late-term abortions.2
Aggravating factors included a husband causing his wife's abortion, or
the abortionist being a physician, surgeon, healer, midwife, pharmacist,
an assistant thereof, or a medical student.233 Forced abortion and fetal
homicide were penalized with up to five years of imprisonment.2 34
Peru: Abortion was prohibited by the Criminal Code 235 and subject
to penalties of up to ten years for abortionists and up to four years
imprisonment for the woman who aborted. Physicians, surgeons,
midwives, and pharmacists faced suspension of professional practice for
up to five years.236 Fetal homicide provisions applied if the woman's

223.
224.
225.
226.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

227. Id. at 385, CRIMINAL CODE OF PANAMA, vol. II, tit. XIII, ch. IV, CRIMES AGAINST
PERSON, arts. 326-30.

228. Id.
229. Id.
230.

Id. at 443-44, CRIMINAL CODE OF PARAGUAY, vol. II,

§ I, ch.

XII, CRIMES AGAINST

LIFE, BODILY INTEGRITY AND HEALTH OF THE PERSON, arts. 349-54.

231.
232.
233.
234.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

235. Id. at 486-87, CRIMINAL CODE OF PERU, vol. II,
AND HEALTH, arts. 159-64.

§ I, tit. II, CRIMES AGAINST

LIFE, BODY

236. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss2/3

30

De Jesus: Revisiting Baby Boy v. United States: Why the IACHR Resolution di

REVISITING BABY BOY V. UNITED STATES

201l]

251

state of pregnancy was obvious, and could result in a two-year prison
sentence.2 3 7
Uruguay: Uruguayan criminal law 23 8 established up to nine months
imprisonment for the woman who aborted her unborn child, and up to
eight years for the abortionist. Article 318 of the Criminal Code
contains a fetal homicide provision, stating violence against pregnant
women resulting in abortion of their unborn child was subject to up to
nine years imprisonment, the highest penalty for that crime in Latin
America at the time.239 Aggravating factors included disability or
minority of the pregnant woman, or the victim's husband causing the
abortion.
Venezuela: Procured abortion was a crime in Venezuela, 240
punishable with up to two years imprisonment for the woman who
aborted and five years for the abortionist who performed the procedure.
Article 416 regarding fetal homicide established a penalty of up to six
years in prison for perpetrators.241 Aggravating penalties were applied if
a victim's husband caused the abortion, if the abortionist was a
healthcare professional, or a public health official.2 42 Suspension of
professional exercise was equivalent to conviction time.24 3
In any event, according to the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, Article 31(3)(b), the Commission should have first looked at
"any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation[,]"
rather than relying on previous state practice as a supplementary means
of interpretation in and of itself.244
Even though the Baby Boy Commission did not delve into state
practice at the time of the decision, or contemporary opinio juris on
abortion, an analysis of Latin American laws would have demonstrated
that, although some countries had decriminalized some forms of
abortion (Brazil, Argentina, Cuba, and Panama), virtually no state had
embraced abortion on demand or "without restriction as to reason." 245
237.

Id.

238.

Id. at 775-76, CRIMINAL CODE OF THE REPUBLIC OF URUGUAY, vol. II, tit. XII, ch. II,

CRIMES AGAINST PHYSICAL AND MORAL PERSONHOOD, arts. 318, 325-28.

239. Id
240. Id. at 863-64, CRIMINAL CODE OF VENEZUELA, vol. II, tit. IX, ch. IV, CRIMES AGAINST
PERSONS, arts. 416, 432-36.

241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, May 22, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1 1
1969.pdf (emphasis added) [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
245. The phrase, coined by Center for Reproductive Rights, refers to abortion on demand
with minimal restrictions. See Center for Reproductive Rights, Legal Restrictions at
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Moreover, many of the above penalties for voluntary abortion remain in
place in many Latin American states. For instance Chile and El
Salvador still have full bans on all forms of abortion. 46 Other states,
like Honduras and Nicaragua, that did not ban all voluntary abortion
then, prohibit all forms of elective abortion now. 247 Other countries, like
Peru or Chile, now prohibit abortifacient drugs, in addition to surgical
abortions.2 4 8
b. Selective Reliance on 1946 Domestic Exceptions to
Criminal Abortion
A closer examination of the resolution's list also demonstrates it
misrepresented legal exceptions to criminal abortion in Latin America.
Exceptions to criminal abortion were much more rare and narrower than
the Commission conveyed. While the exceptions simply enumerated
life, health, rape, and "preventing" transmission of hereditary or
contagious disease (ironically, by terminating the life of the fetus), 249
further examination of the Latin American criminal codes consulted by
Dunshee sheds light on the specificity of the language defining such
exceptions.
Exclusion of criminal penalties for abortion applied in eleven
different countries (Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador,
Mexico, Nicaraguao Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) for
different reasons.
Exceptions could apply in the following
circumstances: a) when abortion constituted "the sole means" of saving
the mother's life-a very narrow life-of-the-mother exception (i.e., in
Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Brazil and Argentina); b) to
prevent "serious and/or permanent" harm to the mother's health (i.e.,
Cuban and Peruvian Codes); c) eugenic abortions, directed to prevent
the live birth of unborn children affected with hereditary or contagious
disease; and d) when the pregnancy resulted from rape, particularly,
when the victim was mentally disabled (Brazil).2 5 1
At present, most of the exceptions would be inconsistent with the
http://reproductive rights.org/en/our-issues/abortion/legal-restrictions?page=27& more= 1.
246. See Thematic Hearing "Maternal Mortality in the America," Center for Reproductive
Rights, Amnesty International, Foro Salud Perii, Movimiento Aut6nomo de Murjeres de
Nicaragua, International Initiative on Maternal Mortality and Human Rights, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/prensa/publichearings/Hearings.aspx?Lang=EN&Session=l 17&page=
2
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1,1 19(e).
250. See C6DIGOS, supra note 150.
251. See id
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American Convention and other international human rights instruments.
For instance, eugenic abortions of disabled unborn children or forced
abortions on mentally disabled women would violate the InterAmerican Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities. 252 Fortunately, many
of these exceptions, particularly forced abortions for mentally disabled
women, have disappeared from contemporary criminal codes, thus
granting greater human rights protection to disabled women and unborn
children.
In addition, the Commission misrepresented honoris causa abortions
as exceptions to criminalization when, in reality, they were only
mitigating circumstances. Several states considered the intent "to
conceal an honest woman's dishonor" when obtaining an abortion to be
a mitigating circumstance in sentencing (Bolivia, Colombia, Cuba,
Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, El Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela).25 3 This antiquated
honoris causa provision aimed at attenuating penalties for women
whose pregnancy resulted from an illegitimate union was not, as the
resolution falsely indicated, an exception to criminal abortion, but only
a mitigating circumstance. Nicaragua should consequently be removed
from the list. So should the United States and Puerto Rico.
Furthermore, the language in life-of-the-mother exceptions in most
Latin American countries as the "sole means" of saving the mother's
life indicates that criminal codes viewed abortion as a measure of last
resort and required all means of medical treatment be exhausted before
resorting to abortion, if at all. Likewise, the language in criminal codes
regarding "serious or permanent" harm to the mother's health evinces
similar restraint. In her commentary on Baby Boy, Rita Joseph points
out that the resolution deliberately misrepresented legal tolerance of the
inevitable loss of a child in providin life-saving treatment to the
mother as an abortion permitted by law.
These misleading findings were followed by the erroneous
conclusion that, based on the incompatibility between the Declaration
and their domestic laws in 1946 (allowing for abortion only in very
limited circumstances), States Parties left "conception" out of the
American Declaration's drafting in order to exclude unborn children
from right to life protection and to preserve, implement, or expand their
legalization of abortion at the time.
252. O.A.S., Inter-American Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Persons With Disabilities, pmbl., June 8, 1999, AG/Res. 1608, available
at http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/sigs/a-65.html.
253.
254.

See C6DIGOS, supra note 150.
JOSEPH, supranote 113, at 232.

255.
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These errors of historical fact in the Commission's resolution were
carried out with a self-serving purpose-to convey the false impression
that lealized abortion was the norm rather than the exception at the
time,
and that most states recognized exceptions to the crime of
abortion in one way or the other when, actually, only a few nations did,
and the exceptions were very narrow and States Parties granted very
broad protection to the unborn child's right to life. Rita Joseph pointed
out that the resolution's superficial analysis of the Convention drafting
history was at best, carried out with "careless disrespect for historical

accuracy."217
Moreover, even if states had contemplated as broad a legality of
abortion as the Commission portrayed them to, the existence of such
laws should not be considered an insurmountable obstacle for
recognition to be given to the human being's right to life from the
moment of conception, as Commissioner Tinoco pointed out in his
dissenting opinion. 258 Even if some incompatibility existed, by signing
the American Declaration, states adopted Article I as an aspirational
provision for which they strived, even if full compliance with it may
have not been possible at the time of ratification.
Before the Declaration's adoption, many other human rights
violations were taking place in accordance with the states' domestic
law, such as the death penalty.259 As Professor Shelton pointed out,
numerous examples could be found in legislation and practice existing
at that time that would violate rights drafted into the Declaration and
that normal international practice seeks to bring the restrictive national
legislation into conformity with international human rights aspirations
and not the reverse. 260 Had the argument that national laws conflicted
with the Declaration been raised as a defense for other human rights
violations, such as forced disappearances or racial discrimination, the
Commission would have certainly rejected it prima facie. As the
petitioners in Baby Boy stated, "numerous human rights violations have
been based upon orderly processes for creating law." 261 However, as
Rita Joseph points out, it has been a consistent and clear guiding
principle in negotiating all human rights instruments that previously

1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, T 19(h).
256. JOSEPH, supranote 113, at 225.
257. Id.
258. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 1 14 (Dr. Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro,
dissenting).
259. Id. 19(e).
260. SHELTON, supra note 10, at 3; see also Shelton, Abortion and Right to Life, supra
137, at 314.
261. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1,1 17(g).
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existing domestic laws are to comply with international human rights
laws, and not vice versa.2 62
In that regard, Commissioner Monroy Cabra asserted that domestic
laws allowing abortion in limited circumstances did not preempt future
revision of those laws for the purpose of adopting new norms that
would protect the unborn child's right to life in virtue of the American
Convention, according to the principles of customary international law
and the constitutional laws of each State. 263 He stated that
incompatibility between domestic legislation of some states that
allowed abortions in limited circumstances, "does not feat to the
conclusion that the IX International Conference of American States in
Bogota intended to take the position that life should be protected only
from birth and not from conception." 264
Likewise, it is a well-known principle of international human rights
law that the mere existence of domestic law legitimizing some human
rights violations does not, in and of itself, justify noncompliance with
international human rights obligations adopted by a given state. Articles
27 and 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2 65
regarding internal law and the observance of treaties, state that "[a]
party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification
for its failure to perform a treaty." 266
In this regard, the Inter-American Court on Human Rights held, in
its Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, that the existence of domestic laws
validating violations of human rights do not justify a breach of the
American Convention. 267 Therefore, the Commission should have
concluded that the mere existence of legal elective abortion in the
United States did not justify non-compliance with the American
Declaration or Convention.
According to Article 41(b) of the American Convention, when
domestic laws are incompatible with international human rights law, the
Commission may recommend individual states to adopt "progressive
measures" to harmonize their domestic laws and constitutional
262. JOSEPH, supra note 113, at 204.
263. See Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 3 (Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy
Cabra,dissenting).
264. Id.
265. Commissioner Monroy Cabra pointed out that, according to these articles, should
conflict arise between domestic and international law, international law would take precedence
and states parties that adopted the American Declaration would have an obligation to modify
their domestic laws accordingly. Id.
266. Vienna Convention, supra note 244, art. 27.
267. International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in
Violation of the Convention (arts. 1 & 2 of the American Convention on Human Rights), InterAm. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, % 31-35 (Dec. 9, 1994), available at
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_14-ing.pdf.
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provisions with their human rights obligations.2 6 8 Thus, in Baby Boy,
the Commission could have recommended that the United States adopt
progressive measures to further the observance of the unborn child's
right to life in the United States, in virtue of the American Declaration,
accordin to the Inter-American Court's advisory opinions on the
matter.2 6
Had the Commission properly applied the above provision in Baby
Boy, and had it applied the American Declaration in light of its original
intent, it could have found the United States in violation of the
American Declaration for failing to punish Edelin for taking the life of
Baby Boy, and could have recommended that he be brought to justice.
The Commission could have also found the legalization of abortion to
be in violation of the Declaration and could have recommended
legislation protecting the unborn child's right to life from conception.
Instead, the Baby Boy Commission enabled the U.S. Government to
disregard the American Declaration by endorsing Roe, thus legitimizing
Edelin's impunity for the abortion of Baby Boy, and validating millions
of voluntary abortions of unborn children subsequently performed in the
United States.
2. The Recognition of the "Right to Life from the Moment of
Conception" Since the 1959 Inter-American Council of Jurists'
Draft Convention
In the hopes of reinforcing the Declaration's protection of the right
to life from conception, the petitioners had requested the Commission to
interpret the Declaration in light of Article 4(1) the American
Convention, believing the Commission would uphold its true
meaning. 270 Perhaps, for the same reasons, the U.S. Government
opposed the request.27 ' While admitting that the Convention clearly was
intended to complement the Declaration, the State Department argued
the two documents existed "on different legal planes and must be
analyzed separately." 272 It alleged that the specificity of the rights
enumerated in the Convention, compared to the vagueness of the
Declaration, could not be attributed to a non-party to the Convention,
such as the United States, that had not agreed to any of the
268. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 4.
269. See International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in
Violation of the Convention, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, 39; see also
Certain Attributes of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion,
Inter-Am. C.H.R. OC-13/93, 29 (arts. 41, 42, 44, 46, 47, 50, and 51 (July 16, 1993), available
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea 13_ing.pdf.
270. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.IV/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 2.
271. Id. M14(a)-(b).
272. Id. 1 14(b).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol23/iss2/3

36

De Jesus: Revisiting Baby Boy v. United States: Why the IACHR Resolution di

201l]1

REVISITING BABY BOY V. UNITED STATES

257

Convention's provisions via treaty ratification. 273
The Commission refused the petitioners' request and supported the
government's position, stating that, in relation to non-parties to the
Convention, human rights are understood to be the rights set forth in the
Declaration only, according to the Statute of the IACHR (Articles I and
2 of 1960 Statute and Article 1 of 1979 Statute).2 74 The Commission
stated that "[i]t would be impossible to impose upon the [U.S.
Government] or that of any other State Member of the OAS, by means
of 'interpretation,' an international obligation based upon a treaty that
such State has not duly accepted or ratified." 275 Likewise,
Commissioner Andr6s Aguilar, in his concurring o inion, pointed out
the Convention did not apply to the petition at hand.
In addition, the Commission reiterated that, given the fact that the
United States had not ratified the Convention the Commission lacked
jurisdiction to apply that treaty in Baby Boy.2Y7 Furthermore, it pointed
out that the human rights violations at hand had occurred before the
Convention entered into force on July 18, 1978, and the petition was
filed before that date, 278 making the application of the Convention even
more inappropriate.
Why the Commission then chose to delve into an interpretation of
the Convention even though it recognized its lack of jurisdiction, and
even though it decided not to use it as a means to interpret the
280
279
Declaration, remains a mystery. Perhaps the political weight of the
United States in Latin America and in the O.A.S., or its influence as the
nation containing the IACHR headquarters may have motivated some
members of the Commission to align themselves with all of the State
Department's arguments. Perhaps Dunshee and some of the
273. Id.
274. Id. 17.
275. Id. 31.
276. See id. 2, 4 (concurring decision, Dr. Andrds Aguilar M.).
277. See id
1, 3, & 17 (majority opinion).
278. See id. 1 1; see also Commissioner Tinoco's dissenting opinion, where he pointed out
that Roe and Bolton could not be considered by the Commission, despite the influence they may
have had in Commonwealth v. Dr. Kenneth Edelin, because of "the passage of time since 1973
when those decisions were handed down" Id. 1 16 (Dr. Tinoco, dissenting opinion).
279. Interestingly enough, the Commission's practice after Baby Boy has taken an opposite
direction; the IACHR now adamantly affirms that the Declaration must be interpreted in light of
the Convention, even for non-state parties. See Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, Case
11.140, Inter-Am C.H.R., Report No. 75/02, Doc. 5, rev., 860, 97 (2002). Had this been the
case with the Baby Boy petition, nonetheless, the outcome would probably not have been very
different, because the Commission read article 4(1) of the Convention to be compatible with the
legalization of voluntary abortion. See Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 31.
280. Commissioner Monroy Cabra found this application of the Convention particularly
inappropriate. See Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 5 Conclusions (Dr. Marco
Gerardo Monroy Cabra, dissenting).
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Commissioners themselves wanted to make sure a pro-choice reading of
Article 4(1) would be recorded, even if such an interpretation could be
done only in a non-authoritative manner. Outsiders to the IACHR will
probably never know. In any case, Commissioners MonroyCabra and
Tinoco asserted that such an interpretation was inappropriate, and
refused to endorse the majority opinion's understanding of the right to
life article.2 8'
Latin American States originally intended to protect the unborn child
from intentional abortion from the beginning of the Convention's
preparatory work, since its first draft by the Inter-American Council of
Jurists, where the right to life "from the moment of conception" was
explicitly recognized. 8 2 The Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs of the O.A.S., held at Santiago, Chile in 1959,
commended the Inter-American Council of Jurists with the preparation
of a draft of the American Convention on Human Rights. The draft
consisted of eighty-eight articles, beginning with a definition of the
right to life (draft Article 2) that stated: "this right shall be protected by
law from the moment of conception." 2 84 The words "and, in general"
were introduced later.
In Baby Boy, the Commission echoed the U.S. State Department's
theory that the Convention's travaux prdparatoires demonstrated that the
Convention's drafters introduced the expression "in general" in Article
4(1) of the Convention to create a specific exception to the protection of
the right to life for abortion, the decriminalization and legalization of
which states allegedly wanted to preserve or expand.2 8 5
First, it is important to emphasize that the initiative to include the
expression "in general" in the Convention's text did not come from
democratic consensus among States Parties to the American
Convention, but actually came from the Inter-American Commission
itself, of which Carlos Dunshee was a member at the time. 2 86 The
Second Specialized Conference of Inter-American States (Rio de
Janeiro, 1965) considered the Inter-American Council of Jurists' draft
with two other drafts presented by the Chilean and Uruguayan
Governments, and asked the O.A.S. Council to prepare the draft
Convention to be submitted to the San Jos6 Conference, upon
287
It was at that point that the
consultation with the IACHR.
Commission issued an Opinion where it suggested introducing the
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

See id.; see also id. 2. (Dr. Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro, dissenting).
Id. 21 (majority opinion).
Id. 22.
Id.
Id. % 14, 30.
Baby Boy, OEA/Ser. LIV/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 1f 23-27.
Id. 23.
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words "in general" in draft Article 2 concerning the right to life.2 88
Second, the resolution itself reveals that the expression "in general"
may have been introduced on account of former Commissioner Dunshee
himself, the Baby Boy resolution's author. On the occasion of the debate
within the IACHR in 1968, then-Commissioner Dunshee,
unsuccessfully attempted to deprive the unborn child from his right to
life from conception altogether by proposing to delete the entire final
phrase "in general, from the moment of conception."289 His proposal
was based on the argument that including a right to life protection for
the unborn child would have created conflict with Article 6(1) of the
U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 290 a weak claim because
Article 6 of the ICCPR states the right to live in a general way, there
being no possibility of conflict with the American Convention.
Furthermore, Article 6(5) of the ICCPR acknowledges that unborn
children of pregnant women on death row ought to be protected from
abortion.291 The Commission, therefore, rejected his radical proposal,
given that "for reasons of principle, it was fundamental to state the
provision on the protection of the right to life in the form recommended
to the Council of the OAS in its opinion [sic]." 292 It was thus decided to
leave the right to life protections "from the moment of conception," as
indicated by the Inter-American Council of Jurists. 29 3
Eventually, the right to life protection from conception remained and
the ambiguous expression "in general" was introduced into the new
Convention's draft by the Commission. The Baby Boy resolution
alleged that the addition of the new words was motivated by the same
inexistent political compromise that supposedly led to the deletion of
"from the moment of conception" during the approval of the American
Declaration.294 Because those facts were fabricated, it is implausible
that they motivated the IACHR's inclusion of the said expression. In
any case, the said IACHR Opinion was incorporated into the
Convention draft in a working document that was submitted to States
Parties for their approval. The Permanent Council of the O.A.S.,
considering the Opinion, gave a mandate that the Convention be
288. Id. J 23-27.
289. Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 97 (1968); General Secretariat of the
O.A.S., Washington, D.C. (1973).
290. See Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 97 (1968); General Secretariat of
the O.A.S., Washington, D.C. (1973).
291. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 6 I.L.M. 368 (1967).
292. Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 97 (1968); General Secretariat of the
O.A.S., Washington, D.C. (1973).
293. See Inter-American Yearbook on Human Rights, 97 (1968); General Secretariat of
the O.A.S., Washington, D.C. (1973).
294. Id.T25.
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submitted as a working document to the Inter-American Specialized
Conference on Human Rights, where States Parties would vote on the
adoption of the final text.2
At the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights,
held in San Jos6, Costa Rica on November 22, 1969, states expressed
their continued intent to protect the right to life from the moment of
conception. The removal of "in general" was suggested by the
In
Delegation of Ecuador, despite the Commission's Opinion.
addition, the representative for Venezuela indicated that regarding a
human being's right to life from the moment of conception "there may
be no concessions" and stated a Convention that did not consecrate this
principle would be "unacceptable." 297 Several states, such as Chile and
El Salvador reiterated the importance of protecting the right to life from
conception, 98 and others mentioned it as a part of natural law and

natural rights. 2 99
Remarkably, a closer examination of the Actas y Documentos of the
San Jos6 Conference on Human Rights shows that the only proposal to
eliminate right to life protection "from the moment of conception" in
order to allow abortion was advanced by no other than Dunshee
himself, who served as a representative for the government of Brazil at
the Conference.300 On this occasion, he reiterated his proposal that the
entire phrase "in general, from the moment of conception" be deleted.o1
Even though he admitted Brazil's Civil and Criminal Codes protected
the right to life from conception and prohibited abortion at the time, he
indicated the latter allowed abortion in limited circumstances (rape and
life-of-the-mother exceptions).30 2 Therefore, he argued that abortion
should be a matter for states to decide. 303 Dunshee (not States Parties,
like he falsely indicated in the resolution) then tried to use a different
approach by arguing that the right to life from conception provision was
so vague that it would not be effective in preventing parties to the future
Convention from legalizing "the most diverse cases of abortion." 304 The
U.S. Representative (Richard D. Kearney) supported his proposal, even
though the United States ultimately did not become a party to the
295. See id.
296. Actas y Documentos, supra note 98, at 160-61.
297. Id. at 121
298. Id.
299. Id. at 447.
300. Id. at 121.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9 rev. 1, 1 14(c) (citing Actas y Documentos, supra note 98, at
159).
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treaty. 3 05 Ultimately, the proposal was rejected by the parties present at
the Conference.
In Baby Boy, the Commission later indicated that the Dominican
Republic had advocated for the deletion of the whole phrase "in general,
from the moment of conception" intending to exclude abortion as a
human rights violation. 306 This, however, was a misrepresentation, since
the Dominican Republic actually advocated for a whole new redaction
that would state, among others, that "the right to life is inherent to the
human person," thus evoking Catholic ideas of human dignity, not the
intent to disentitle the unborn child from right to life protection, as
Dunshee indicated.3 0 7
Although the phrase "in general," added by the Commission,
eventually remained, no indication was given at the Conference that
they intended to create abortion exceptions to the right to life by its
inclusion.308 Later, on March 2, 1981, upon its ratification of the
Convention, Mexico, a state that excluded criminal penalties for
abortion under some circumstances, specifically made its own
"interpretative declaration" akin to a reservation, to Article 4(1) of the
Convention: "[w]ith respect to Article 4, paragraph 1, the government
of Mexico considers that the expression 'in general' does not constitute
an obligation to adopt, or keep in force, legislation to protect life 'from
the moment of conception,' since this matter falls within the domain
reserved to the States." 309
Obviously, Mexico would not have needed to make this reservation
if there was agreement among States Parties that "in general" should be
interpreted as including abortion. On the contrary, Mexico probably
presumed that the interpretation of those words was different, and, for
that reason, chose to make its own interpretative declaration on it. In
any event, note that Mexico declared that it did not believe that Article
4(1) required it to adopt domestic measures to protect unborn life
because this was a question within the domestic jurisdiction of the state
of Mexico; Mexico did not, however, specifically refer to abortion.
Thus, no original intent of States Parties to include abortion among
legitimate exceptions to the right to life in current Article 4 can be
found in the records of the Convention's travaux pr6paratoires other
305. Actas y Documentos, supranote 98, at 121, 160.
306. See Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 1 28. Dominican perspectives on
the right to life from conception have changed since Baby Boy. In 2009, the Dominican
Republic amended its constitution, article 37 of which now declares that "the right to life is
inviolable from conception until death." Constitucion de la Republica Dominica Jan. 26, 2010,
art. 37, availableat http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/DomRep/vigente.html.
307. Actas y Documentos, supra note 98, at 57.
308. See id. at 121.
309. American Convention, supra note 4, "Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica" (Original
Instrument and Ratifications).
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than in Dunshee's own proposals as a Brazilian delegate and as a
Commissioner, which were eventually redected by the rest of the
Commission and the San Jos6 Conference.
B. The IACHR's Breach ofInternationalRules ofInterpretation
1. The Ordinary Meaning of Article 4(1) of the American Convention
According to international rules of treaty interpretation, as codified
in the Vienna Convention Article 31(1), the text of the American
Convention should be used as a primary source of interpretation, using
the "ordinary meaning" rule: "[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms
of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and
purpose." 31 1
Instead of examining the treaty text first, the Commission in Baby
Boy looked at state practice before the adoption of the American
Declaration and at two isolated-and rejected-proposals during the
Declaration and the Convention's travaux pr6paratoires, and suggested
that both instruments allowed for the abortion of unborn children
wherever legal, thus emptying their right to life articles of their
significant meaning. 3 12 It also carried out a figurative, rather than
textual, reading of the Convention text, contrary to Article 31(1) of the

Vienna Convention. 3 13
In addition, the Commission violated both the American Convention
and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties rules on good faith
interpretation of treaties. 314 Dunshee's proven bias in favor of
legalization of abortion in Latin America indicates that his pre-existing
partiality in favor of creating abortion rights in the Inter-American
system inevitably tainted his good faith as the author of the Baby Boy
resolution.
Likewise, the Baby Boy Commission adopted an advocate role rather
than a semi-judicial, and thus impartial approach. Rather than approach
the task of examining the petitioners complaint in Baby Boy as judges,
the Commission adopted the U.S. view of what the meaning of Article
4(1) should have been and then devised arguments to support this view.
Lawyers representing clients are expected to proceed in this manner.
310. Id.
311. See Vienna Convention, supranote 244, art. 31.
312. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, T 18(a).
313. See JOSEPH, supra note 113, at 227.
314. American Convention, supra note 4, arts. 29-31 (good faith and non-restrictive
approach); Vienna Convention, supra note 244, art. 31(1) (good faith).
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However, Inter-American Commission members are expected to act, if
not exactly as judges, very similar to their functions, as objective,
impartial third parties whose main concern is the application of the
American Convention, whatever their personal views on abortion may
be.
Commentators have not been oblivious to that fact. Regarding the
Declaration's interpretation, Rita Joseph, for instance, referred to the
an
"ideologically
driven
conclusion
as
resolution's
misrepresentation" 315 and suggested the Commission in Baby Bo may
have read into the historical records what was never there.31 Even
Dinah Shelton, who agreed with Baby Boy's ultimate outcome, 3 17
indicated the Commission had reached its conclusions through
"questionable reasoning, faulty analysis and little or no attention paid to
the usual canons of construction of international documents." 8 She
pointed out that the opinion of the Commission did not, at any point,
examine the meaning of the text of Article I in the context of the
Declaration "as a whole" and that "this reliance on legislative history
allows the majority to interpret the Convention to conform to its
understanding of the Declaration in spite of obvious differences in
language and purpose." 319 She pointed out that the opinion of the
Commission did not look in detail at the text of Article I in the context
of the Declaration "as a whole" and that "this reliance on legislative
history allows the majority to interpret the Convention to conform to its
understanding of the Declaration in spite of obvious differences in
language and purpose." 320 Later, in her article on international
protection of the unborn child, Dinah Shelton posed the following
question:
Looking at the provisions of the Declaration, it is evident that
article I is unique. While all other rights speak of "persons," the
right to life is extended to "all human beings." Applying the
canon of construction that each word has its own meaning, the
question is whether the term "human being" is broader than
"persons"[. . .]?321
Commissioners Cabra and Tinoco would have probably concluded
315. JOSEPH, supra note 113, at 217.
316. Id. at 218.
317. She believed limiting the inquiry to the Declaration text could have produced the
same conclusion with "a better reasoned argument." See Shelton, Abortion and Right to Life,
supra note 137, at 314.
318. Id. See also SHELTON, supra note 10, at 4.
319. See also Shelton, Abortion and Right to Life, supra note 137, at 312-13.
320. Id.
321. Id.at3-4.
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that it is a broader term, aimed at including the unborn child and all
other human beings, not just those recognized as "persons" or those
enjoying contractual or legal capacity before the law.
Regarding the American Convention's interpretation, the ordinary
meaning of the terms of Article 4(1) in their context and in the light of
its object and purpose is clear: the Convention protects the unborn
child's life from conception, that is, protects the human embryo and
human fetus's right to life from abortion, from the time of fertilization
until birth. The object and purpose of the American Convention was to
protect every person's right to life from the moment of conception, not
birth. The Convention's language is unequivocal about it. In Baby Boy,
Commissioner Monroy Cabra asserted:
If international agreements are to be faithfully and literally
interpreted, in keeping with the meaning that should be attributed
to the terms of a treaty and read in context, taking into account
the objective and purpose of that treaty, there is no doubt that the
protection of the right to life should begin at the moment of
conception. 322
If Article 4(1) was not designed to protect the unborn child's life
from death by intentional abortion, as the Commission suggested, what
would it be designed to protect it from? A very restrictive interpretation
that held only "forced abortions" of wanted children are human rights
violations under the Convention would undermine the very object and
purpose of the right to life provision, since the Convention does not
limit the right to life to wanted unborn children. Simply being unwanted
would clearly constitute an "arbitra "' line, and arbitrariness is
expressly prohibited by Article 4(1). 3 The Convention makes no
distinction between wanted or unwanted unborn children, since
fundamental rights are universal and inalienable; it therefore grants a
right to life to all unborn children and protects all of them from elective
abortion, including undesired children like Baby Boy. 324
States Parties to the American Convention have persistently
understood that Article 4(1) of the treaty prohibits abortion.325 For
instance, written declarations submitted at the Beijing and Cairo
International Conferences by the Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua invoked the American
322. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 6 (Dr. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, dissenting).
323. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
324. See id.
325. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/1I.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 11 (Dr. Luis Demetrio Tinoco Castro,
dissenting).
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Convention when rejecting interpretations of terms like "birth control,"
"family planning," or "unwanted pregnancy" as including a purported
right to abortion. 6
At the International Conference on Population and Development,
Guatemala rejected the interpretation of abortion as a reproductive or
sexual right, or reproductive health service on chapter II and chapter VII
of the ICPD document in virtue of its incompatibility with both the
American Declaration and the American Convention, noting that "life
exists from the moment of conception[,] and that the right to life is the
source of all other rights." 3 27 El Salvador objected to the inclusion of
abortion as a reproductive right or related reproductive health or family
planning service, by stating that "we [] Latin American countries [] are
signatories to the American Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San
Jose). Article 4 thereof states quite clearly that life must be protected
from the moment of conception.

. .

. [F]or this reason . . . we consider

that life must be protected from the moment of conception." 328
Likewise, the Dominican Republic rejected the interpretation of
terms like "reproductive health," "sexual health," "safe motherhood,"
"reproductive rights," "sexual rights," and "regulation of fertility'" as
including an alleged right to abortion or termination of pregnancy.3 2 9 it
entered its reservation in accordance with its Constitution and laws and
held that "as a signatory of the American Convention on Human Rights,
it fully confirms its belief that everyone has a fundamental and
inalienable riVht to life and that this right to life begins at the moment of
conception."
Similarly, Honduras specifically stated its objection to
abortion as a reproductive right, in light of
the American Convention on Human Rights, which reaffirms that
every person has a right to life and that this right will be
protected by law and will be protected in general, starting from
the moment of conception, based on moral, ethical, religious[,]
and cultural principles which should regulate the international
community, and in accordance with internationally recognized

human rights. 33 1
At the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, the
326. See U.N. Population Fund, Report of the International Conference on Population and
Development, 157, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.171/13/Rev.1 (Oct. 18, 1994) [hereinafter Cairo]; U.N.
Secretary-General, Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women, 157 U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 177/20/Rev.1 (1996) [hereinafter Beijing].
327. Cairo, supra note 326, at 157.
328. Id.19.
329. Beijing, supra note 326, 17.
330. Id.
331. Id. 12.
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Dominican Republic objected to the interpretation of "reproductive
rights" and related terms as including abortion or the voluntary
interruption of pregnancy, by stating that the "Dominican Republic, as a
signatory to the American Convention on Human Rights, and in
accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, confirms
that every person has a right to life, and that life begins at the moment
of conception." 332
Similarly, the Nicaraguan state representatives, in their statement at
the Beijing Conference on Women, rejected the inclusion of abortion as
a reproductive right, or as a reproductive health service. They stated that
"as a signatory of the American Convention on Human Rights, the
government of Nicaragua reaffirms that every person has the right to
life, which is a fundamental and inalienable right, and that this right
begins with the moment of conception" and that "abortion or the
termination of pregnancy cannot in any way be considered a method of
regulating fertility or birth control, as was made clear by the
International Conference on Population and Development. The
domestic laws governing this matter are within the sovereign purview of
the Nicaraguan nation."3 33 Also at the Beijing Conference, Honduras
reiterated its understanding that "the American Convention on Human
Rights, of which our country is a signatory, reaffirms that every
individual has the right to life from the moment of conception, on the
basis of the moral, ethical, relipious[,] and cultural principles that
should govern human behavior." 33
Even non-parties to the Convention have been aware of its abortion
prohibition. For instance, Canadian debates on the ratification of the
Convention illustrate its express fear that Article 4(1) of the Convention
would conflict with Canadian law, where abortion currently enjoys a
fundamental right status and is widely available.33 5
2. The Non-Restrictive Interpretation of the Right to
Life from Conception
The interpretation of the Convention in Baby Boy, inferring abortion
to be compatible with Article 4(1) where legal, followed such a
restrictive approach that it effectively voided the right to life protection
from conception of its meaning. 336 The States Parties' original intent
332. Id. 7.
333. Cairo, supra note 326, 14.
334. Beijing, supra note 326, 1 12.
335. Standing Senate Committee on Human Rights, Enhancing Canada'sRole in the OAS:
Canadian Adherence to the American Convention on Human Rights (2003), available at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/huma-e/rep-e/rep04may03-e.htm.
336. JOSEPH, supra note 113, at 230.
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when drafting the American Declaration and the Convention was so
distorted in Baby Boy that the Convention and the Declaration's
protection of an unborn child's right to life was significantly reduced,
rather than simply applied or expanded, in the resolution. 337
Such a restrictive interpretation is prohibited by the American
Convention's rules of interpretation. Article 29(a) of the Convention
states that "[n]o provision of this Convention shall be interpreted
as permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the
enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this
Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for
herein". In carrying out a restrictive interpretation of the unborn child's
right to life from conception, the Commission not only failed to follow
international rules of treaty interpretation, but also failed to abide by the
Inter-American Court jurisprudence regarding the international
obligation to interpret the right to life, especially that of children, in a
non-restrictive manner.
The Inter-American Court has reiterated that the right to life is a
non-derogable, inalienable right, the full exercise of which is a
prerequisite for the enjoyment of all other human rights, and that any
restrictive approach to it is inadmissible. 338 In accordance with Article
27(2) of the Convention (on suspension of guarantees), it has
recognized that this right is part of the fundamental entitlements that
cannot be repealed insofar as it is regarded as one of the rights that may
not be suspended in time of war, public danger, or other emergencies
that threaten the independence or security of the States Parties.3 39
Likewise, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (Art.
4(2)) and the Preamble of the Protocol to the American Convention on
Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty 340 state that the inalienable
337. Id.
338. See Case of Montero-Aranguren (Detention Ctr. of Catia) v. Venezuela, Preliminary
Objection, Merits, Reparations, & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 63 (July 5,
2006); see also Case of the Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits,
Reparations, & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, 150 (Mar. 29, 2006); see also Case
of Balde6n-Garcia v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 147, 1
83 (Apr. 6, 2006); see also Case of the "Street Children" (Villagrin-Morales), Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, 1 144 (Nov. 19, 1999); see also Case of the Pueblo Bello Massacre v.
Colombia, Merits, Reparations, & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, 1120 (Jan. 31,
2006); see also Case of 19 Tradesmen, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 109, 153 (July 5,
2004); see also Case of Myrna Mack-Chang, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 1 152 (Nov.
25, 2003); see also Case of Balde6n-Garcia v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 82 (Apr. 6, 2006).
339. See Case ofBaldedn-Garcia,Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 101, 82; see also Case
of the Pueblo Bello Massacre, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, 119.
340. O.A.S., American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, 1990,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 73, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.82, Doc. 6, rev. 1, 80 (1990) (adopted at Asunci6n,
Paraguay, on June 8, 1990, at the twentieth regular session of the General Assembly, entered
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right to life cannot be suspended for any reason, not even under times of
war, public danger, emergency, or constitutional suspension of
guarantees. In addition, the American Convention on Human Rights
adds the impossibility of suspending other rights, such as the protection
of the family, the right to a name, the right to nationality, political
rights, and the rights of the child.34 '
Under Article 4(1) of the Convention, unborn children, like all other
human beings, enjoy a non-derogable right to life protection. Their right
to life may not be subject to derogation or suspension even in time of
war, public danger, or other emergency, much less derogated at will
outside of those circumstances. Having been recognized in the
American Declaration and American Convention, the right to life of the
unborn child cannot be unrecognized, as it is inalienable by nature.
Neither should the inalienable, non-derogable right to life of the unborn
child be subject to calculations of proportionality with other competing
interests, such as a purported right to privacy or even an inexistent right
to abortion. The right to life prevails over all lesser interests, due to its
fundamental nature.
C. Children'sRight to Life, A Norm ofJus Cogens
The Inter-American Court has consistently favored non-restrictive
approaches to recognition of the right to life, particularly that of
children. In Servell6n Garcia, the Court held that children have special
rights derived from their condition, and these are accompanied by
specific duties of the family, society, and the State; violations against
their right to life are especially gross, the Court indicated. 34 The
indifference or disdain for the life of unborn children should then have
equally grave connotations.
The Court has held that when it comes to the right to life of children,
that States Parties to the American Convention have a twofold
obligation under Articles 4 and 19 of the American Convention. The
into force Aug. 28, 1991) [hereinafter American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the
Death Penalty].
341. IACHR, The Rights of the Child in the Inter-American Human Rights System, InterAm. C.H.R., 49 (2d ed. 1998), available at http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Infancia2eng/
Infancia2Cap 1.eng.htm.
342. Servell6n-Garcia v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 152, 113 (Sept. 21, 2006); see also Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the
Child, Advisory Opinion, Inter Am. Ct. H.R., OC-17/02 (ser. A) No. 17, 1 54 (Aug. 28, 2002)
(citing Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, 244 (July 1, 2006)); see also Mapiripin Massacre v.
Colombia, Merits, Reparations & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, 152 (Sept. 15,
2005); Case of the girls Yean & Bosico, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 130, 1 33 (Sept. 8,
2005).
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state's obligation to respect the right to life of every person under its
jurisdiction takes on special dimensions in the case of children, and it
becomes an obligation to "prevent situations that might lead, by action
or omission, to breach it," compounded by the added obligation
established in Article 19 of the American Convention, to promote the
rights of the child.34 3 Likewise, the Court mentioned that Article 19 of
the Convention must be understood as complementary to Article 4,
requiring special measures of protection for children, due to their
physical and emotional development. 3 A non-restrictive interpretation
of the Convention would therefore find that tolerance or legalization of
elective abortion, an act specifically directed to take the life of an
unborn child, constitutes not only a violation of Article 4(1), but also a
violation of Article 19 for failure to prevent the violation of the rights of
the child and to ensure special measures of protection.
In Villagrin Morales, the judges, in their concurring opinion,
stressed the duty of the State to take positive measures precisely in
relation to the protection of life of vulnerable and defenseless
persons.3 45 They stressed "the needs of protection of the weaker. . ." in
finding an "inexorable link" between Articles 4 (right to life) and 19
(rights of the child) of the American Convention . . . .

Such

principles regarding children's right to life also apply to unborn
children.
Furthermore, the Commission has gone as far as affirming that the
right to life, especially that of children, is a norm of jus cogens, that is, a
norm that cannot be validly derogated, whether by treaty or by the
unilateral objection of a state, but only by the formation of a subsequent
customary rule of contrary effect.3 47 In 2002, in Michael Domingues v.
United States, the Commission held that the prohibition of imposinf the
death penalty on children was an international jus cogens norm. It
343. See Mapiripdn Massacre, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, 14; see also Case of
the G6mez-Paquiyauri Bros. v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), $T 124, 171; see also Bulacio
v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment of September, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 100,
18 (Sept. 18, 2003), available at http://cidh.org/Ninez/docyjurisprudenciaeng
Corte.htm.
344. See Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, &
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, 1 244 (July 1, 2006); see also MapiripdnMassacre,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, 1 152; see also Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay,
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, & Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, 1
147 (Sept. 2, 2004); see also Servelldn-Garcia, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser C) No. 152, 113.
345. See Case of the "Street Children" (Villagr~n-Morales), Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C)
No. 63, 4 (Nov. 19, 1999).
346. See id. 7
347. Michael Domingues v. United States, Case 12.285, Inter Am. C.H.R., Report No.
62/02, IT 49, 85 (2002), availableat http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/usa.12285.htm.
348. See id. TT 5, 85.
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explained that norms of jus cogens derive their status from fundamental
values held by the international community; they are peremptory norms,
the violations of which are considered to shock the conscience of
humankind and therefore bind the international community as a whole,
such as the prohibition of genocide, slavery, forced disappearances, and
torture. 349 Likewise, in Villagrin Morales, the Commission, in its final
arguments before the Court, underscored the jus cogens nature of the
right to life referring to children, in particular, and the fact that it is the
essential basis for the exercise of the other rights. It emphasized that
"[tihe right to life cannot be annulled" and that "[t]he violation of that
norm . . . has not been the object of any corrective." 350 Inter-American

Court Judges A.A. Cangado Trindade and A. Abreu-Burelli agreed with
the Commission and stated, in their concurring opinion, that "there can
no longer be any doubt that the fundamental right to life belongs to the
domain of jus cogens." 35 1 Therefore, since the unborn child enjoys right
to life protection from the moment of conception in Article 4(1) of the
Convention, there are no valid reasons for a different standard to apply
to their right to life when violated by intentional abortion.
D. A Non-Restrictive Interpretationof "In General"
The Inter-American Court has noted that the right to life has been
too often narrowly interpreted, and indicated the inherent right to life
In both
cannot be properly understood in a restrictive manner.
353
Gomez
and
Guatemala
Villagrin Morales and Others v.
3 54 the Court held that the "right to life is a fundamental
Paquiyauri,
human right, and the exercise of this right is essential for the exercise of
all other human rights. If it is not respected, all rights lack meaning.
Owing to the fundamental nature of the right to life, restrictive
approaches to it are inadmissible." 35 5
349.
350.
351.
Burelli).
352.

Id. $ 49.
See Case ofthe Street Children, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, T 137-39.
Id. 1 2 (joint concurring opinion of Judges A.A. Cangado Trindade and A. AbreuSee id

3 (majority opinion):

The right to life cannot keep on being conceived restrictively, as it was in the
past, by reference only to the prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of
physical life. We believe that there are distinct ways to deprive a person
arbitrarily of life: when his death is provoked directly by the unlawful act of
homicide, as well as when circumstances are not avoided which likewise lead
to the death of persons as in the cas d'espice.
353. Id.
354. Id.
355. Id. T 144; see also G6mez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C),
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A non-restrictive interpretation of the expression "in general" in
Article 4(1) of the American Convention could have yielded two
different readings, both in harmony with the right to life from
conception granted under the article. The relatively more restrictive
reading, in this sense, would be that the expression "in general" applies
to the right to life from conception only. The relatively least restrictive
reading would be that the expression "in general" applies to Article 4(1)
as a whole.
The first interpretation would imply that a plain reading of Article 4
would permit states to create certain exceptions to the unborn child's
right to life. Legitimate exceptions to the right to life from conception,
from a non-restrictive approach, would include unintended, involuntary
abortions, such as those occurring during non-abortive medical
procedures or medical treatment.356 They could also legitimately include
malpractice laws that protect physicians and institutions from liability
for unintended miscarriages; or "fetal homicide" situations where early
pregnancies were unknown to perpetrators and criminal liability was
reduced or annulled for that reason. They may even include exceptions
to fetal homicide penalties where the woman's state of pregnancy was
unknown, as scholar Rita Joseph suggests. 357
The second reading of "in general" as applying to Article 4(1) as a
whole, not selectively to "the moment of conception," would mean that
the Convention allows for legitimate limitations of the right to life in
general, not from the moment of conception only. On June 12, 1979, the
Baby Boy petitioners supported this type of interpretation by pointing
out that "the term 'in general' cannot be viewed as applying only to the
prenatal period, by reason of the logical structure and wording of the
statement of the right to life, and the other life-affecting aspects of the
Convention. "358 Legitimate exceptions to the right to life generally
would include self-defense, involuntary manslaughter (still valid in all
States Parties), as well as humanitarian law exceptions for armed
conflict, and even exceptions for the unintended death of unborn
children.
The Court seems to have interpreted Article 4(1) that way in Yakye
Axa v. Paraguay, where it found no evidence to prove a violation of the
right to life:
Pursuant to Article 4(1) of the Convention[,] every person has the
right for his or her life to be respected and guaranteed, and not to
2 (July 8, 2004).
356. See JOSEPH, supra note 113, at 228-30.
357. Seeid at 228-29.
358. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 23/81, Mar. 6,
1981, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 1 17(f).
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be arbitrarily deprived of it. While this Court deems that, in
general, the obligation to respect and guarantee the life of the
individuals under its jurisdiction is linked to the responsibility of
the State that can derive from its actions or omissions, in the case
of the alleged responsibility for the death of those sixteen
individuals, this Court does not have sufficient evidence to
establish the causes of said deaths. 359
In addition, legislative history shows some States Parties to the
Convention meant to allow for exceptions to the right to life other than
abortion, such as the death penalty, highly debated at the time of the
Declaration's adoption. In fact, it was the death penalty, and not
abortion, that states actually discussed during the Declaration's travaux,
at the Bogoth Conference. o For that reason, the American Convention
later restricted its application in Articles 4(2) and (3), and States Parties
eventually abolished the death penalty in 1991 through the Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death

Penalty.36 1
Two reasons clearly indicate that capital punishment may have been
the exception States Parties had in mind when adopting the text of
Article 4(1), including the phrase "in general."36 2 First, the fact that the
paragraphs immediately following Article 4(1) dealt with the death
penalty would explain the meaning of the phrase. 363 Second, three states
(Barbados, Guatemala, and Trinidad and Tobago) made reservations on
Article 4, confirming an understanding that, according to the
Convention, the death penalty could actually be considered a legitimate
exception to the right to life in limited circumstances. 3 64
In any event, a non-restrictive reading of the American Convention
should apply general principles of international human rights law, such
as the pro homine principle, also called the pro personae principle, 36 5
codified in Article 29(b),66 which is repeatedly applied by the Inter359. Case of the Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Interpretation of the Judgment
of Merits, Reparations, & Costs, Ser. C No. 142, f 177-78 (Feb. 6, 2006).
360. Baby Boy, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, Doc. 9, rev. 1, 19(e).
361. American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, supra note
340.
362. American Convention, supra note 4, art. 4(1).
363. Id. art. 4(2)-(6).
364. See General Information on the Convention, supra note 8. The Dominican Republic
also filed a declaration-not technically a reservation. Id.
365. See Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser.
C) 11 (Nov. 27, 2008); Raxcac6-Reyes v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, InterAm. C.H.R. (ser. C) 12 (Sept. 15, 2005).
366. See Acevedo-Jaramillo v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Inter-Am. C.H.R. T 283 (Feb. 7, 2006); see also "Five Pensioners" v. Peru, Merits,
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American Court to children and illegal immigrants,367 among others.
The Commission has also recognized the pro homine principle as a
controlling guideline for interpreting the Convention, and in human
rights law in general. 36 8 This principle establishes that, when in doubt,
the interpretation that grants an individual greater human rights
protection and leads to the fullest protection of human dignity should
prevail. The Court has held that, in accordance with this principle, "the
fundamental criterion which creates the very nature of human rights
requires that the norms which guarantee or extend human rights be
broadly interpreted and those that limit or restrict human rights be
narrowly interpreted." 3 69 The Commission has also stated that, in order
to prevent human rights restrictions from becoming the rule rather than
the exception, the broadest rule and the most extensive interpretation
have to be applied when recognizing human rights. 370
In any case, it is worth mentioning that the interpretation carried out by
the Commission in Baby Boy admitted that the widespread availability of
abortion, or "without restriction as to reason" 371 would be a violation of
Article 4, because the Commission stated that "an abortion which was
performed without substantial cause based upon the law could be
inconsistent with article 4.",372 Therefore, even according to the
resolution's creative reinterpretation of the Convention, it is evident that
States Parties certainly would have expected protection of unborn life to
be the norm, rather than the exception.

Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser. C) 143 (Feb. 28, 2003).
367. See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory
Opinion, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OC- 18/03 (Sept. 17, 2003) (requested by Mexico); see also Juridical
Condition and Human Rights of the Child, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OC-17/2002
(Aug. 28, 2002) (requested by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights).
368. See Andr6s Aylwin Azocar, Case 11.863, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 137/99, 1
146 (Dec. 27, 1999), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/merits/chilel1.863.htm;
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In concluding, it is important to differentiate what the Baby Boy
resolution did and what it did not do.
Baby Boy did not set international precedent or international
jurisprudence on the unborn child's right to life in the Inter-American
system, since the IACHR is a quasi-judicial body, which means that its
reports are non-binding and the Baby Boy resolution, in particular, was
less authoritative given the peculiar nature of individual petitions
against the United States. The resolution, therefore, has no legally
binding effect on parties to the American Convention on Human Rights
or on the Inter-American Court on Human Rights.
Baby Boy did not produce either an authoritative or semiauthoritative interpretation of the American Declaration or the
Convention on abortion, not only due to its non-binding, informal
nature, but also because of its distorted analysis of the original intent
behind both instruments, and its breach of international rules of
interpretation, which undermined the true meaning of the right to life
from conception enshrined in both instruments. Baby Boy did not
particularly produce an authoritative interpretation of the American
Convention Article 4(1), given that the Commission had no jurisdiction
to apply the Convention to the United States or the petition against it,
and because the Commission refused to use it as a means to interpret the
Convention.
Baby Boy did not attempt to create a right to abortion in the InterAmerican system on human rights. The resolution only held that
legalization of abortion was not prohibited by the Declaration or the
Convention, but did not say that abortion was a human right protected
by the Convention. It clearly stated that an abortion without "substantial
cause" would be arbitrary.
On the other hand, Baby Boy did reflect the 1981 Commission's
political stance in favor of legal abortion by legitimizing the death of an
aborted unborn child and holding that U.S. abortion law was compatible
with the American Declaration on Human Rights. Given the IACHR's
political influence in Latin America and the Caribbean, and given
general misconceptions regarding the Commission's nature and the
authority of its resolutions, Baby Boy may have obscured a proper
understanding of the American Declaration, and, particularly, the
Convention, misleading States Parties to believe that the expression "in
general" in the American Convention's Article 4(1) creates legitimate
exceptions for different forms of elective abortion, which it does not. 374
373. Id.
374. For more on the Commission's stance on abortion after Baby Boy, see Ligia M. De
Jesus, Post Baby Boy v. U.S. Developments in the Inter-American System of Human Rights:
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In conclusion, although Baby Boy may have had a negative impact
on perceptions about the content of the American Convention, in reality,
States Parties to the American Convention, the Inter-American Court
judges, and new Commission members 375 have no legal obligation to
abide by Baby Boy or to follow its reasoning in current or future
abortion-related petitions. They may still reaffirm the ordinary meaning
of Article 4(1) of the American Convention and uphold the
Convention's true protection of the life of the unborn child from
conception, either at the O.A.S. General Assembly, the IACHR, or the
Inter-American Court on Human Rights.
Both the original intent behind the American Declaration and
Convention, as well as a non-restrictive interpretation of their content,
support the unborn child's protection from all forms of elective abortion
or any act that intentionally causes fetal death or embryo destruction.
Such acts are not, and can never be, legitimate exceptions to the right to
life from the moment of conception under the current text of Article
4(1) of the American Convention.

Inconsistent Application of the American Convention's Protection of the Right to Life from
Conception, LAw & Bus. REV. OF THE AMs. (forthcoming Aug. 2011).

375. Neither the Inter-American Commission, nor the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, rely on stare decisis for their decision making; therefore, Baby Boy need not be followed
by the Commission in subsequent petitions dealing with similar facts.
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